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Abstract
Security protocols are communication protocols that aim at enforcing secu-
rity properties through heavy use of cryptographic primitives. These proto-
cols are at the core of security-sensitive applications in a variety of domains
(e.g. transportation, health-care, online banking and commerce). Failures
are not a option as may cause heavy loss of capitals, time and even humans
life. In spite of their apparent simplicity, security protocols are notoriously
error-prone and so a number of verification techniques were developed to
cope with the verification of such protocols. However most of the proposed
protocol specification languages and verification techniques are limited to
cryptographic protocols where quantitative temporal information is not cru-
cial (e.g. delay, timeout, timed disclosure or expiration of information do not
affect the correctness of the protocol), and details about some low level tim-
ing aspects of the protocol are abstracted away (e.g.: timestamps, duration
of channel delivery, etc.).
In this thesis we face the problem of specifying and verifying security
protocols where temporal aspects explicitly appear in the description. For
these kinds of protocols we have designed a specification formalism, which
consists of a state-transition graph for each participant of the protocol, with
edges labelled by trigger/action clauses. The specification of a protocol is
translated into a Timed Automaton on which standard techniques of model
checking can be exploited (properties to be checked can be expressed in a
linear/branching untimed/timed temporal logic). We also study the protocol
insecurity problem for time dependent security protocols with a finite number
of sessions, extending to the timed case the results of M. Rusinowitch and
M. Turuani [RT03] stated for the untimed case. We show that the extension
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to time and the increased power of the intruder model we propose do not
affect the complexity of the problem which remains NP–Complete.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The constant growth of dependency of many human activities on computer
systems and applications has made fundamental their verification phase.
Malfunctions, still largely tolerated in personal computing systems, is unac-
ceptable for safety critical systems whose failure or malfunction may result
in: death or serious injury to people, or loss or severe damage to equip-
ment or environmental harm. The usual verification techniques known as
testing, debugging or simulation usually cover only a fraction of the admis-
sible behaviours of the system and, while widely used and understood, do
not guarantee the degree of confidence required by safety critical systems.
Disasters like the explosion of Ariane 5 (due to a floating point overflow),
the Pentium FDIV bug or the death of two people caused by the software
controlled medical machine for radiotherapy Therac25 shows that conven-
tional validation techniques based on informal arguments and/or testing are
not adequate. Complementing those verification techniques formal methods
have been profitably used in various phases of the design of safety critical
systems. Such techniques can mathematically prof that a system conform to
its safety requirements. There are roughly two approaches to formal verifica-
tion, Theorem proving and Model Checking. Theorem proving consists in the
encoding of the system and its requirement in the form of some logic in the
attempt to build a formal proof of the safety of the system. This is usually
only partially automated and is driven by the user’s understanding of the
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system to validate. Model checking, otherwise, is more easily automated.
The user provide a representation of the system using an appropriate La-
belled Transition System (LTS), usually some kind of finite state automaton,
and a formula, usually in some temporal logic (LTL, CTL), representing the
safety goal to satisfy. The model checking algorithm search the state space
of the system in the attempt to violate the goal formula eventually provid-
ing the user with a counterexample. While the inherent complexity of both
techniques somehow limit they adoption and problems like the one of state
explosions limit their use to small systems, both theorem proving and model
checking were effectively used to verify safety critical systems.
A notable class of safety critical systems is the one of security, or crypto-
graphic, protocols. Our society rely on electronic communication massively.
Although much faster and less restrictive than direct communications, those
new kinds of communications seems to lack the trust and safety of usual
direct communications. For example, a third person can easily listen to a
phone communication (problem of confidentiality), or, without proper au-
thentication, send emails on behalf of someone else (SPAM, viruses). Secu-
rity protocols try to ensure some degree of safety by the use of cryptographic
primitives. However, although absolutely necessary to any safe communica-
tion, encryption algorithms are not sufficient to guarantee safety. Designing
secure protocols is a very challenging problem, a number of examples have
shown that their informal design is error prone. In wost case scenarios, the
presence of a motivated intruder or dishonest or careless principals, severe
attacks can be conducted even without breaking cryptography.
Formal methods have been profitably used in various phases of the de-
sign of cryptographic protocols (specification, construction and verification).
Much work has been then devoted to formal specification and analysis of
cryptographic protocols, leading to a number of different approaches and en-
couraging results. Most of the proposed protocol specification languages and
verification techniques are limited to cryptographic protocols where quantita-
tive temporal information is not crucial (e.g.: delay, timeout, timed disclosure
or expiration of information do not affect the correctness of the protocol), and
details about some low level timing aspects of the protocol are abstracted
10
away (e.g.: timestamps, duration of channel delivery, etc.). In this con-
text, the specification language HLPSL has been proposed within the Avispa
Project (see [ABB+05]), for the specification of industrial-strength security
protocols. HLPSL allows for modular specifications, specification of control
flow patterns, data-structures, and security properties. It is also sufficiently
high-level to be used by protocol engineers.
In this thesis we focus on the problem of specifying and verifying se-
curity protocols where temporal aspects directly affect the correctness of
the protocol, and, therefore, need to be explicitly considered both in the
specification and the verification and how time affect the complexity of the
verification. Examples of time sensitive protocols are, for instance, the non-
repudiation Zhou-Gollmann protocol [ZG97], the TESLA authentication pro-
tocol [PCTS02] and the well known Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [BAN89].
1.1 Thesis Structures
This thesis is divided in the following main chapters:
- Chapter 2 - where we set the basic formal concepts this thesis build on.
In this chapter are defined the concepts of timed automaton, model
checking, and temporal logics;
- Chapter 3 - where we define what is a security protocol and how can be
modelled and verified using the industry standard HLPSL language;
- Chapter 4 - where we define what is a timed security protocols. How
this class of protocols relate with the untimed ones and the challenges
it pose for a correct specification. We will present three timed pro-
tocols and an extension to the HLPSL language that allow for a easy
specification of temporal constraints. We will end with the language
formal semantics;
- Chapter 5 - where we will describe a framework for the verification
of timed security protocols based on the extended language. We will
11
verity the presented protocols and show the framework performances
compared to some alternatives;
- Chapter 6 - where we will focus on the computational complexity of the
addressed problem and how it relate to previous bibliography results;
- Chapter 7 - where we summarise the conclusions of this thesis and
future directions that may be worth exploring.
12
Chapter 2
Formal Background
The purpose of this chapter is to set the basic formal concepts this Thesis
focuses on. The chapter presents the formalism of the Timed Automata in
section 2.1 and the one of the Difference Logic in 2.7. In section 2.4 are
presented decidability results related to the model checking of both those
formalisms.
2.1 Timed Automata
Timed systems, like device drivers, ATM, communication protocols, are sys-
tems whose behaviour and dynamics are dependent on time. Subject to
rather stringent timing constraints those systems must react in time: they
are time-critical.
Example 2.1.1 For a system controlling a gate is essential to close within
a certain time bound after detecting the approaching train to halt car and
pedestrian traffic before the train reaches the crossing.
Many different formalisms are used to model timed system, both in
continuous-time and discrete-time. Between those formalism the one of
Timed Automata, introduced by [AD94], have received much interest in the
past years. There are many extension of that formalism accounting many
peculiar featured and enjoying different decidability properties.
13
s0start s1 s2
a
x ≤ 5
b
x := 0
Figure 2.1: An Example of Timed Automaton
We begin by giving the intuition behind the model before a more formal
insight of its syntax and semantic.
Consider the automaton depicted in figure 2.1.
Much like an usual Bu¨chi Automaton we have a some states (s0, s1, s2),
a starting (s0) and an accepting state (s2), we have transitions triggered
by symbols of an alphabet Σ = {a, b}; however, differently from the usual
untimed models, transitions are also decorated (x := 0 and x ≤ 5 ) using
constraints and resets over a set of non negative real valued variables called
clocks. Intuitively, as the automata stay in a location, the value of all the
clocks grows synchronously from the initial value of 0. Transitions firing is
instantaneous and conditions (guards) can check for the value of those clock
variables or reset them. In our example the clock x in the automaton is
checked before taking the transition between s0 and s1 to see if its value is
less than 5 (i.e.: 5 time units passed from the last reset of the clock) and is
later resetted to 0 when taking the transition between s1 and s2. Generally
we can have an arbitrary, but finite, number of clocks in our automaton and
each transition can check and reset the value of more clocks at once. The
syntax of checks performed, the kind of resets allowed and, moreover, features
like the ability to constraint the time passed in a location (via guards like con-
straints called invariants), synchronisation between different automata, etc..,
determine the particular timed automata extension used and its decidability
properties.
Timed Automata accept sequences of symbols paired with a non-negative
real value called timed words, intuitively the time that symbol was accepted.
For example the timed automaton in figure 2.1 can accept the sequence
(a, 3), (b, 2).
We now present formally the Timed Automata syntax as defined in [AD94].
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2.1.1 Syntax
Given a finite set of clocks C valued over a dense domain (eg.: R≥0) and a
finite set of symbols Σ.
The set of clocks constraints over C, Φ(C) is built using boolean combina-
tions of atomic constraints of the form x#c with x ∈ C, # ∈ {=,≤, <,≥, >}
and c ∈ Q≥0.
Inductively Φ(C):
- (x ≤ c) ∈ Φ(C), with x ∈ C and c ∈ Q≥0;
- (c ≤ x) ∈ Φ(C), with x ∈ C and c ∈ Q≥0;
- ¬φ ∈ Φ(C) if φ ∈ Φ(C);
- (φ1
∧
φ2) ∈ Φ(C) if φ1 ∈ Φ(C) and φ2 ∈ Φ(C).
Given a set of clocks C with their values being in R≥0, a clocks valuation
ν is a function C → R≥0 that associates to each clock x ∈ C its value in R≥0,
ν(x).
A clocks valuation ν satisfies an atomic constraint (x#c) if and only if,
using the usual semantic of the constraints, (ν(x)#c) is true.
We denote with ν |= g the fact that the clocks valuation ν satisfies a
timing constraint g.
Given a clocks valuation ν over C, for each t ∈ Q≥0, ν + t is the valuation
that assign to each clock x ∈ C the value ν(x)+t. Moreover given two subsets
X, Y ⊆ C and Y ⊆ X with ν ′ = [Y 7→ t]ν we denote the clocks valuation for
X such that ∀y ∈ Y ν ′(y) = t and ∀x ∈ X − Y ν ′(x) = ν(x).
A finite state timed automaton over the symbols alphabet Σ and the set
of clocks C is a tuple
〈Σ, L, L0, C, δ〉
where,
- Σ is the finite set of symbols;
- L is a finite set of locations;
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- L0 ⊆ L is the set of initial locations;
- C the set of clocks;
- I : L→ Φ(C) the invariant map, associating to each location an invari-
ant guard, timely constraining the ability of the automaton to stay in
a location;
- δ ⊆ L×L×Σ× 2C ×Φ(C) is the transition function. An element of δ,
〈s, s′, a, λ, φ〉, also written as s a,λ,φ→ s′, represent the transition between
the location s to the location s′ upon the receipt of the input symbol
a. The set λ ⊆ C is the set of the clocks resetted to 0 upon the firing
of the transition while φ ∈ Φ(C) is the guard of the transition (i.e.: the
condition that must be true before the transition take place).
The timed automaton depicted in figure 2.1 can be defined as follow:
- Σ = {a, b};
- L = {s0, s1};
- L0 = {s0};
- C = {x};
- I = ∅;
- δ = {(s0, s1, a, x, ∅), (s1, s2, b, ∅, x ≤ 5)}
A time sequence τ = τ1τ2 . . . is an infinite sequence of clock values with
τi ∈ Q≥0 satisfying the following constraints:
- Monotonicity: the values of τ grown monotonically; ∀i, ti ≤ ti+1;
- Progress: ∀t ∈ Q≥0 ∃i ≥ 1 : τi > t.
As we said a timed word on the Σ alphabet is a pair (a, τ) where a =
a1a2 . . . is a infinite sequence of symbols of Σ and τ is a time sequence. The
16
set of the timed word accepted by an automaton A is the language accepted,
L(A), by that automaton.
A run r over a timed automaton is an infinite sequence like:
r : 〈s0, ν0〉 (a1,τ1)→ 〈s1, ν1〉 (a2,τ2)→ 〈s2, ν2〉 . . .
with si ∈ L and νi clock valuation satisfying the following conditions:
- Initialisation: s0 ∈ L0 e ∀x ∈ C, ν0(x) = 0;
- Sequentiality: ∀i ≥ 1 there is a transition 〈si−1, si, a, λ, φ〉 in δ and νi
is equal to [λi 7→ 0](νi−1 + τi − τi−1).
Acceptance for a timed automaton is defined like the one over generalised
Bu¨chi automaton: defined a subset F ⊆ L of accepting states a run r is
accepting on a timed word it passes through at least one state of every set
of accepting states infinitely often; denoting with inf(r) the set of infinitely
recurring states in r i.e: ∩F 6= ∅.
2.1.2 Semantic
The semantic of a timed automaton A = 〈Σ, L, L0, C, I, δ〉 can be defined
using an infinite Labelled Transition System (LTS), TSA.
Intuitively each state in TSA is a pair 〈l, ν〉, called instantaneous descrip-
tion, with l location of the timed automaton and ν a clock valuation.
Formally the LTS associated to an automaton A = 〈Σ, L, L0, C, I, δ〉 is a
tuple TSA = 〈S, s0,→,Σ〉 where:
• S = L×R≥0;
• s0 = (l0, v0) with l0 ∈ L0 and v0(x) = 0∀x ∈ C is the clock valuation
that assign 0 to each clock;
• →: S × S × Σ the transition relation. We have:
- action transitions: (l, v) →a (l0, v0) if and only if there exists
e = (l, g, a, r, l0) such that v |= g, v0 = [r 7→ 0]v and v0 |= I(l0)
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〈s0, x = 0〉 〈s0, x = 0.6〉
〈s1, x = 0〉 〈s1, x = 4.2〉
〈s2, x = 4.9〉
0.6
a
4.2
b
Figure 2.2: The LTS associated to the automaton of figure 2.1
i.e.: there is a transition from l to l0 on the symbol a whose guard
is satisfied by v while the valuation v0 obtained by v resetting the
clocks in r satisfy the invariant of l0;
- time transitions: if d ∈ R≥0 then (l, v)→d (l, v + d) if and only if
v + d |= I(l).
An important remark is that due to the underlying clocks dense domain
two consecutive time transition can be merged, e.g.: the two consecutive
transition (q, v) →t (q, v′ = v + t) →t′ (q, v′ + t′) are equivalent to the
transition (q, v) →t+t′ (q, v + t + t′). Inversely a time transition (q, v) →t
(q, v + t) can be decomposed in an arbitrary number of consecutive time
transitions (q, v) →t′ (q, v) →t1 . . . →tn (q, v + (t1 + tn)) →t′ for a suitable
choice of t1, tn.
As an example in figure 2.2 is the associated LTS of the timed automaton
in 2.1, double lines represent time transitions, single lines are action transition
and dashed lines represent transitions to not showed states.
2.1.3 Timed Automata Related Results
In the seminal paper [AD94], the authors prove a number of properties re-
garding timed automata. In detail:
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s0start s1
a, b
a
x := 0
x 6= 1, a, b
Figure 2.3: A non complementable Timed Automaton
Closure Properties
Timed automata are closed under the operation of union and intersection but,
differently from the Bu¨chi Automata, not complementation. The closure for
union and intersection come as a direct consequence of the non determinis-
tic nature of the timed automaton. The non deterministic nature of timed
automata is also the cause of its non closure under complementation. The
proof in [AD94] is based on the observation that, due to the non determinism
of the timed automaton, a timed word can have an execution ending in both
a final and a non final location making impossible to build the complement
for a timed automata. For example the timed automaton in figure 2.3 is not
complementable [AD94].
Universality, Timed Language Inclusion, Equivalence and Empti-
ness Problems
The universality problem, checking if given an alphabet Σ an automaton
accept all the words over it, for timed automata is undecidable. The prof
come by reduction from the undecidable problem of halting of 2-counter
machines. The problems of timed language inclusion, i.e.: L(A) ⊂ L(A′), and
equivalence, i.e.: L(A) = L(A′) is also undecidable since proving them require
the ability to complement a timed automata. The emptiness problem, i.e.:
the automaton recognises the empty language, it never reach an accepting
location, is PSPACE-Complete.
19
Problem Results
Union Closed
Intersection Closed
Projection Closed
Complementation Not closed
Language inclusion Undecidable
Language equivalence Undecidable
Universality Undecidable
Language emptiness / reachability analysis PSPACE-Complete
Table 2.1: Timed Automata Decidability Problems
2.1.4 Timed Automata Classes and Extensions
A number of works stemmed from the [AD94] paper trying to find useful
subsets or extensions to the timed automata formalism obtaining better de-
cidability results or more expressive formalisms. We summarise the principal
results, a more thorough work is available in [BP09].
Deterministic Timed Automata
The original definition of the Timed Automata was inherently non determin-
istic, but differently from untimed automata, a source of non determinism
source could be the transition guards. In [AD94] the authors define the class
of deterministic timed automata restricting the definition by adding the con-
strains:
• there is only a single initial location;
• two transitions from the same location on the same input symbol must
have their guards disjoint.
Adding the above constrains effectively remove the non determinism caused
by the transition guards. The Deterministic Timed Automata are a less ex-
pressive subclass of (non deterministic) Timed Automata. That also mean
that the problem of determinizing a Timed Automaton is undecidable (i.e:
there is no procedure that accepts a non deterministic timed automaton and
20
Class or extension Emptiness checking Language inclusion
Timed automata PSPACE-Complete Undecidable
Deterministic timed
automata
PSPACE-Complete Decidable
Event-clock automata PSPACE-Complete Decidable
Robust timed au-
tomata
PSPACE-Complete Undecidable
-transitions without
clocks resets
PSPACE-Complete Undecidable
-transitions with
clocks resets
PSPACE-Complete Undecidable
Diagonal constraints
(x− y ∼ c)
PSPACE-Complete Undecidable
Additive constraints
(x+ y ∼ c)
Decidable for 1 or 2
clocks, open problem
for 3 clocks and unde-
cidable starting from 4
clocks[BD00]
Undecidable
Constraints of the
form x = 2y
Undecidable[AD94] Undecidable
Constraints with irra-
tional constants
Undecidable[Mil00] Undecidable
Non-standard (x := 0)
clocks resets
Decidable for x := c,
undecidable for x :=
x−1 and decidable for
x := x + 1 if diago-
nal constraints are not
allowed[BP09]
Undecidable
Table 2.2: Timed Automata Extensions
returns a deterministic timed automaton that recognise the same timed lan-
guage). The problem of language inclusion is however decidable.
Event-Recording Timed Automata
The event-recording automata [AFH99] are a class of Timed Automata that
contains, for every input symbol a, a clock, Ca, that records the time of the
last occurrence of a. The fundamental property in event-recording automata
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is that the value of clocks only depends on the input word. This characteristic
make this formalism determinizable and closed under all boolean operations
while expressive enough to model timed transition systems. Being closed
under all boolean operations make also the language-inclusion problem de-
cidable.
Robust Timed Automata
The ability to measure precise time constraints is probably the main source
of undecidability and non closure under complementation [AD94]. As no
real world system can be expected to be as precise as Timed Automata
expectations, Robust Timed Automata [GHJ97] relax its time constraints
and recognises timed words with some fuzziness in the event. Unexpectedly,
the authors believed that the removal of real-time equality constraints would
lead to a decidable theory that is closed under all boolean operations like
what happen in temporal logic, however the Robust Timed Automata still
cannot be determinized.
Bounds and Extensions of the Timing Constraints, Resets, Transi-
tions
Many authors have studied how the kind of timing constraints, reset and
transitions allowed effect the decidability properties of the Timed Automata.
For example silent, -transition, (i.e.: transition triggered by no symbol), that
in the case of untimed automata do not add to the expressiveness and can be
removed easily, strictly adds to the expressiveness of the Timed Automata
and cannot be easily removed ([BPDG98]). In [DGP97] the authors show
a complex procedure to remove -transitions when they do not reset clocks.
In [AD94, BDFP04, BD00] the authors show how constraints of the form
x = 2y, additive constraints (i.e.: x + y ∼ c), diagonal constraints (i.e.:
x − y ∼ c), constraints with irrational constants, and non-standard clocks
resets (i.e., x := c), affect the the closure and decidability of an automaton.
Table 2.2 summarise some of the results.
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2.1.5 Other Timed Formalisms
Timed Automata, while widely studied, are only one of the many formalism
used to model timed system. Others used formalism for modelling timed sys-
tems are Timed Petri Nets and Temporal Logics. Timed Petri Nets [Ram74]
are an extension of the traditional Petri Nets where a transition can be
red only if its enabling duration is in a certain time window. In [BHR06]
the authors, proving that timed Petri nets are not more expressive than
Timed Automata, introduces a class called Read-arc timed Petri nets which
is language-equivalent to timed automata. Temporal Logics even if usually
used for formal verification purposes are sometimes used for modelling timed
systems, for example the Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) [Lam90]. We will
give more details about Temporal Logics in a following section.
2.2 Extended Timed Automata
While the expressiveness of Timed Automata is enough to model even com-
plex timed system trying to model by hand even a simple system can be a
daunting task. There are many extension of the Timed Automata frame-
work that, while keeping the same decidability/closure results, add features
to simplify the creation of models. In particular the Extended Time Au-
tomata (XTA) [BY04] add to the TA formalism features like parallelism and
synchronisation, integer variables, urgent transitions.
2.2.1 Parallelism and Synchronisation
In the XTA framework a network of Timed Automata A is the parallel com-
position A1 ‖ . . . ‖ An of a series of Timed Automata A1, . . . , An, sometimes
called process, combined as a single system using parallel composition in in
the style of the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS)[Mil89].
Automata communicate by means of channels and the synchronous com-
munication style is handshaking. Let Σ be the set of communication channels,
then the symbol a? denotes the receiving action over channel a ∈ Σ, while
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Figure 2.4: An XTA modelling the interaction between a light and its user
the symbol a! denotes the sending action over channel a. Moreover, internal
actions are denoted by an additional symbol τ .
An example of a network of Timed Automata, modelling the interaction
between a light and its user, is in figure 2.4.
The classical Timed Automaton resulting from the parallel composition
of the above network is the closed system represented in figure 2.5.
The semantics is again given by means of labelled transition systems. A
state of the LTS TSA1,...,An is a pair < l, ν >, where l and ν are vectors
of current locations and clock valuations, respectively, one for each TA in
{A1, . . . , An}. In XTA we distinguish between two kinds of transition: delay
transitions and discrete transitions. The rule for delay transition is similar
to the case of a single TA, except that the invariant of a location is the
conjunction of the location invariant of all the parallel components. There
are two rules for discrete transitions defining local actions, where one of the
components makes a move on its own, and synchronisation actions, where two
components synchronise on a channel and move simultaneously. Formally:
Delay Transitions: 〈l, ν〉 d−→ 〈l, ν + t〉 if ν satisfies I(l) and (ν + d) satisfies
I(l), where I(l) =
∧n
i=1 I(li);
Internal Transitions: 〈l, ν〉 τ−→ 〈l[l′i/li], ν ′〉, if li g,τ,λ−−→ l′i, ν satisfies g, ν ′ =
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of the network in figure 2.4
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ν[λ := 0], ν ′ satisfies I(l[l′i/li]);
Synchronisation Transitions: 〈l, ν〉 τ−→ 〈l[l′i/li][l′j/lj], ν ′〉, if there exists i 6= j
such that:
1. li
gi,a?,λi−−−−→ l′i, lj
gj ,a!,λj−−−−→ l′j and ν satisfies gi ∧ gj, and
2. ν ′ = ν[λi ∪ λj := 0] and u′ satisfies I(l[l′i/li][l′j/lj]).
Is important to note that the system progress only when the conjunction
of all the invariants is verified.
2.2.2 Integer Variables
Beside the usual clocks variables XTA allow the use of bounded, initialised,
integer variables. Integer variables con have a local or network global scope
and transition predicates are augmented to allow to check those variables
and change their values.
Semantically, Integer Variables are handles like some kind of non increas-
ing clocks. The clocks valuations ν are extended accordingly as the LTS
rules. The only ambiguity come from the ability to change the value of the
same global integer variable on both the transition of a synchronisation tran-
sition. This case is explicitly handled by choosing a priority in the update
order, i.e.: first execute the update on the output side of the synchronisation
transition and then on the input side.
LTS rules are extended in the following way:
- 〈l, ν〉 τ−→ 〈l[l′i/li][l′j/lj], ν ′〉 if there is i 6= j such that
1. li
gi,a?,ri−−−−−→ l′i, lj
gj ,a!,rj−−−−−→ l′j e ν ∈ gi ∧ gj, e
2. ν ′ = [ri 7→ 0] ([rj 7→ 0]ν) e ν ′ ∈ I(l[l′i/li][l′j/lj])
2.2.3 Urgent Transitions
To force a strong time decisions, i.e.: to force an automaton to leave a state as
soon as possible without enforcing an invariant, XTA allow for the definition
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of urgent transitions. An automaton will not delay execution while in a state
with an enabled outbound urgent transition.
2.3 Model Checking
Model checking is a powerful and automatic technique for verifying finite
state concurrent systems. Introduced by Clarke et al. [CGP99] has been
applied widely and successfully in practise to verify digital sequential circuit
design and communication protocols and it has been integrated in the quality
assurance process of several major hardware companies.
Wide research field in computer science it use a number of different meth-
ods for solving the general model-checking problem:
M |= p
Where M is a model of system, usually in the form of a finite state tran-
sition system, and p is a logic formula, usually of a temporal logic, expressing
some desired requirement. The technique involved in answering that ques-
tion depends on the particular modelling language used to model the system
and the associated temporal logic and in a later section we will detail some
of those technique. A problem that is inherently present when using model
checking technique is the one of state explosion. The use of finite state sys-
tems force the explicit representation of all the system state and that usually
mean that the number of system states grows exponentially with the number
of system components. This problem severely limited the size the applica-
tion of model checking to designs with less than one million states (e.g. an
hardware circuit designs with at most 20 logic gates).
A partial solution to the problem was proposed by K. L. McMillan [McM93].
The proposed idea, called symbolic model checking, was based on the sym-
bolical exploration of the state space through the use of Binary Decision Di-
agrams (BDDs) whose allow computation of transition among sets of states
rather than individual states. Symbolic model checking allowed to verify sys-
tem with up to 1020 states. While addressing the state explosion problem,
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symbolic model checking itself lacked a certain robustness. The problem lied
in the fact that BDDs may grow exponentially, limiting to the amount of
available memory the size of the system to verify. Moreover BDDs are very
sensitive to how the particular system is modelled (and trying to find the
best encoding of a state space as BDDs is NP-Complete). In 1999 Biere et
al. [BCCZ] proposed a technique called Bounded Model Checking (BMC),
which uses a propositional SAT solver rather than BDDs manipulation tech-
niques. Exploiting the dramatic speed-up of propositional solvers it is able
to analyse designs with million of states. Moreover bounded model checking
has been proved to be particularly suited in finding counter-examples, i.e.:
to return paths through the transition system that violate one of the specific
system requirements.
2.4 Temporal Logics
Timed Automata, enjoying decidable reachability properties, are a well-
established model to verify real-time systems. However they are not usable
to represent property of systems in fact one of the most common technique
to verify a system is through the so called Test Automaton. The technique
revolve around the construction of a (timed) automaton representing the
property, i.e.: all the desired behaviour, that we want, and then checking if
all the behaviour of the test automaton are in the our system. This is an
inclusion question, and that problem is unfortunately undecidable for timed
automata.
From this problem the idea to extend classical untimed temporal with
timing constraints creating a formalism, the temporal logics, to express timed
properties. Traditionally temporal logics were better suited speak about the
relative order of events, not about the distance (in time) between these events.
There are two branches of temporal logics:
• linear-time temporal logics allowing reasoning over a single time line;
• branching-time temporal logics allowing reasoning over several time
lines.
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Logic Model-checking problem
TCTL PSPACE-Complete
MTL over finite runs Decidable under the pointwise semantics
Undecidable under the continuous semantics
MTL over infinite runs Undecidable under pointwise semantics
TPTL over infinite runs Undecidable under the pointwise and continu-
ous semantics
Table 2.3: Temporal Logics Decidability Results
The traditional linear-time temporal logis is the Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) [Pnu77], while the traditional branching-time temporal logics is the
Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [CES86].
Both CTL and LTL have been extended to support quantitative time,
CTL giving birth to the Timed Computational Tree Logic (TCTL) [HNSY94]
and LTL to the Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [Koy90] and Timed Proposi-
tional Temporal Logic (TPTL) [RT94].
The branching-time logic TCTL has a rather low complexity, and of-
fer very good decision properties. The linear-time timed temporal logics,
instead, while being more expressive, an interesting properties for writing
specifications, are more complex and offer worse decidability results. In de-
tails the table 2.3 summarise the main result regarding temporal logics.
Since it will be used in the following chapters we will give a more detailed
definition of the TCTL logic.
2.4.1 Timed Computational Tree Logic
Given a set of atomic proposition AP the syntax of TCTL is given by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= a|¬ϕ|ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2|Eϕ1UIϕ2|Aϕ1UIϕ2
where a ∈ AP and I an integral interval of R≥0.
Given a Timed Automaton TA whose locations are encoded as atomic
proposition (i.e: there is a function between the set of locations L and AP
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such that L → 2AP ), and a run r on it 〈s, ν〉. The semantic of the TCTL
formula ϕ is given by the following:
• 〈s, ν〉 |= a⇔ a ∈ (l);
• 〈s, ν〉 |= ¬ϕ⇔ 〈s, ν〉 6|= ϕ ;
• 〈s, ν〉 |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ⇔ 〈s, ν〉 |= ϕ1 or 〈s, ν〉 |= ϕ2;
• 〈s, ν〉 |= Eϕ1UIϕ2 ⇔ there is an infinite run ρ in TA starting from
〈s, ν〉 such that ρ |= ϕ1UIϕ2;
• 〈s, ν〉 |= Aϕ1UIϕ2 ⇔ any infinite run ρ in TA starting from 〈s, ν〉 such
that ρ |= ϕ1UIϕ2;
• ρ |= ϕ1UIϕ2 ⇔ there exists a position along ρ such that ρ[pi] |= ϕ1, for
every position 0 < pi′ < pi, ρ[pi′] |= ϕ2, and duration(pi≤pi) ∈ I.
where ρ[pi] is the state of ρ at the position pi and duration(pi≤pi) is the
sum of all the delay along ρ up to the position pi.
The exact definition of the term position change the semantic of TCTL.
In the continuous semantics, a position in a run ρ is any state appearing
along it. In the pointwise semantics, a position in a run ρ is a state only
right after a discrete action has been done. As seen in table 2.3, differently
from the other temporal logics, the use of one or the other semantics does
not change the decidability of the model checking problem on TCTL.
2.5 Model Checking: Software Tools
Model Checking technique, being almost automatic, go a wide acceptance
in checking real systems and a number of tools were developed for it. For
most uses a Model Checker can be seen as black box, it takes a model of
the system and a properties to check and gives in output the whatever the
properties is satisfied or a trace showing the problematic behaviour of the
system. Properties can be roughly classified into three categories:
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• safety properties, i.e.: something deemed bad is never reached by the
system, ”the system never does . . . ”;
• reachability properties, eventually the property will be satisfied by the
system, i.e.: ”the system can do . . . ”;
• liveness properties, something deemed good will eventually be reached
by the system, ”eventually the system does . . . ”.
Table 2.4 shows some of the most used model checker and the kind of
formalisms the use for the specification of the model of the system and the
goals.
Tool Name Modelling Language Properties Language
Kronos1 Timed Automata TCTL
UPPAAL2 Extended Timed Automata Fragment of TCTL
NuSMV3 Proprietary Language CTL, LTL
BLAST4 Proprietary Language Proprietary Language
SPIN5 Promela (Process Meta
Language)
LTL
TLA+ Proof System
(TLAPS)6
Temporal logic of actions
(TLA)
TLA
a http://www-verimag.imag.fr/ tripakis/openkronos.html
b http://www.uppaal.com/
c http://nusmv.fbk.eu/
d http://mtc.epfl.ch/software-tools/blast/index-epfl.php
e http://spinroot.com/spin/whatispin.html
f http://msr-inria.inria.fr/ doligez/tlaps/
Table 2.4: Model Checking Tools
2.5.1 UPPAAL Model Checker
We will now give more detail about the UPPAAL model checker being it the
model checker used as the verification engine in this work.
UPPAAL is an integrated environment for the modelling, the simulation
and the verification (through model checking technique) of realtime timed
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Figure 2.6: UPPAAL XTA Automata
systems. Started as a JAVA project developed at the Uppsala University
in Sweden, it has since emerged from the academy and reached commercial
maturity and has been used with success to verify a number of systems.
The core of the modelling language used by UPPAAL is the Extended
Timed Automata framework. While being considerably lower level if com-
pared to some model checking specification language the ability to use a GUI
to draw the specification make the specification process comfortable. More-
over is possible to provide a textual description of the XTA network as a,
.xta, text file.
The .xta file format is documented and its syntax is similar to the formal
notation used to describe XTA automaton. This make possible to interface
the model checker with other tools able to automatically generate compatible
.xta files.
For example the two automata in figure 2.6 can be specified using the
following .xta files.
// Comments
clock x; chan s; // Clocks and Synchronisation symbols
// (called channels)
// First Automaton -> A
process A { state a0{x<=10}, a1;// States
// x<=10 invariant of state a0
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init a0; //A initial state
// Transitions
// From a0 to a1 synchronising on s
trans a0 -> a1{sync s!; }; }
// Second Automaton -> B
process B { state b1, b2;
init b1; // B initial State
trans b1 -> b2{guard x<=5; sync s?; }; }
// The system is composed by the A and B automata
system A,B;
Simulation and Verification in UPPAAL
While not being automatic and by far exhaustive simulation can be used to
better understand complex systems behaviour. The UPPAAL GUI integrate
a simulator that allow to dynamically execute the automata network, giving
the possibility to the user to choose what transition are fired and to see the
value of the clocks step by step as shown in Fig.2.7.
One of the most useful feature of the simulator is its integration with the
model checker, in fact the error traces returned by the model checker can be
visualised in it. This allow the modeller to see what steps the system took
to end on a state violating the provided goals.
The verification language used by UPPAAL is a fragment of the TCTL
logic, particularly it doesn’t allow the nesting of the TCTL operators.
We can define as state formulae the conjunction of formulae on the loca-
tions, e.g.: A.a0, the automata A is in the location a0, clock formulae, e.g.:
x ≤ 15 ∧ y ≤ 5 and integer formulae, e.g.: X := true. There is also the
particular state formula deadlock that evaluate to true when the system is
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Figure 2.7: UPPAAL Simulation UI
unable to progress, no exit transitions enabled but forced to leave the current
location.
With φ and ψ state formulae the properties that can be checked are:
- Aφ, invariantly φ, i.e.:every reachable state verify phi;
- E♦φ, possibly φ, i.e.:there is a reachable state that verify φ;
- A♦φ, always eventually φ, i.e.: for every possible path, there exists a
state such that φ is satisfied;
- Eφ, potentially always φ, i.e.: there exists a infinite path to a state
where φ is satisfied by all states at some point;
- φ → ψ every path that contain a state that satisfy φ contain a state
that satisfy ψ. Shorthand for A(φ⇒ A♦ψ).
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Those kind of properties are enough to express the reachability in a sys-
tem.
2.6 Boolean satisfiability problem: SAT
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) is the problem of deciding if there is an assign-
ment for the variables in a propositional formula that makes the formula true.
It was the first known NP-complete problem, as proved by Stephen Cook in
1971. It is of considerable practical interest and has received a lot of atten-
tion and many different algorithms and techniques have been devised to try
and solve it efficiently as many decision problems, such as graph colouring
problems, planning problems, and scheduling problems can be encoded into
SAT. The history of SAT solving can be roughly divided in two eras. Pre
1960, partially because the limited computational powers of time computers
and the complexity of the problem, there was no implementation of SAT
solving algorithms.
In 1960, Davis and Putnam published an algorithm [DP60] (denoted by
DP) which started the interest in SAT solvers. While being very inefficient
it motivated the subsequent development of the Davis-Logemann-Loveland
(DLL) algorithm [DLL62]. The algorithm has been used extensively to solve
many kinds of problems using computers (especially from artificial intelli-
gence and operating research).
In the beginning of the 90’s, computers became powerful enough to solve
medium sized SAT instances using simple implementations. As a conse-
quence, some researchers started studying how to improve SAT solvers in
practice. Benchmarks and worldwide competition has been established and
the quest for the fastest ever solver was born.
Formally, given a set of Boolean variables, called proposition, B, a Boolean
literal is a formula of the form b or ¬b with b ∈ B. A clause is a finite dis-
junction of literals. A formula F in the conjunctive normal form (CNF) is a
finite a conjunction of clauses.
This can be described by the following set rules:
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• Proposition ::= b1|b2| . . . |bn;
• Literal ::= ¬Proposition|Proposition;
• Atom ::= Literal|⊥|>;
• Clause ::= Atom|(Clause ∨ Clause);
• CNFFormula ::= Clause|Clause ∧ Clause;
• Formula ::= Atom|¬Formula|(Formula∧Formula)|(Formula∨Formula);
Solving the SAT problem for a propositional formula φ is the answer to
whenever exist an assignment for the proposition in B that make φ true.
Some common method for solving the problem are:
• enumerating all possible truth values and checking each of them to see
whether it satisfies f;
• performing a backtracking search algorithm through the possible truth
as- assignments of f to show that it is satisfiable. This is what the DLL
algorithm do and is by far the most common;
• checking directly if the formula is a contradiction by completely sim-
plifying or by using the resolution method and testing if the resulting
formula is empty;
• showing that the complement of f 1 is not valid using a theorem prover;
• using binary decision diagrams.
2.7 Difference Logic
The Difference Logic (DL) extend the propositional logic with difference con-
straints, i.e. inequalities of the form (x− y ∼ c) where ∼∈ {<,=}, x and y
are numerical variables, and c is a constant.
Formally let B = {B1,B2, . . .} be a set of Boolean variables and X =
{X1,X2, . . .} a set of numerical variables. The set of atomic formulae of
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DL(B,X ) consists of the Boolean variables in B and the numerical con-
straints in the form Xi −Xj ◦ c with c ∈ Q and ◦ ∈ {<,>,≤,≥}.
The set F of DL formulae is the smallest set of formulae containing B,
all the numerical constraints over X and closed under the usual Boolean
connectives (¬, ∧ and ∨).
The semantics is given w.r.t. a pair of valuation functions (vX , vB) defined
as follows.
An (X ,B) valuation consists of two functions vX : X → {T, F} and
vB : X → R which associate a Boolean value to each Boolean variable and a
real value to each numerical variable, respectively.
A (X ,B)-valuation can be extended to DL formulae in the obvious way.
In particular, 〈vX , vB〉 satisfies the constraint Xi − Xj ≤ c if and only if
vX (Xi)− vX (Xj) ≤ c.
It is well known that the satisfiability problem for DL is an NP–Complete
problem. Notice, however, that satisfiability of the conjunctive fragment of
DL can be solved in polynomial (cubic) time using a variant of the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Floyd-Warshall
Require: edgeCost(i,j) cost of the edge between i and j or infinity
Require: path[i][j] = edgeCost(i,j)
Ensure: path[i][j] shortest path between i and j
for k = 1 to n do
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to n do
path[i][j] = min ( path[i][j], path[i][k]+path[k][j] );
check that ∀x path[x][x] is not negative;
end for
end for
end for
Infact the conjunctive fragment of DL has the following graph interpre-
tation:
• variables are nodes;
• atoms x− y ≤ c are weighted edges;
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• a set of literals is satisfiable iff there is no negative cycle (i.e.: the there
is a minimum path).
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Chapter 3
Formal Verification of Security
Protocols
In this chapter we will introduce the problem of the formal verification of
security protocols. We will start in section 3.1 introducing some background
informations and common notations used in the protocol modelling field.
After this basic information we will show, in section 3.2, how timing infor-
mation are important for the specification of a protocol. In section 3.3 we
will conclude presenting existing, state of the art, approaches to the problem
of the formal verification of security protocols.
3.1 Communication Protocols
Communication protocols specify an exchange of messages between entity
called principals, they are distributed algorithms which focus on messages
exchange [Com00]. The principals are the agents participating in a protocol
execution and can also be called users, hosts, or processes. The communica-
tion take place over channels, ranging from secure ad hoc connection (e.g.:
the communication bus of a secure computing platform, smartcard buses),
open cabled networks, over the air radio (wireless, WiFi) channels, . . . . In
general every message sent over a networks cannot be considered secure.
Even using ad hoc network, and even more in the case of open networks
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such as the Internet, protocols should be designed ”robust” enough to work
even under worst-case assumptions, that is dishonest or careless principals
or a motivated and powerful third party intruder able to eavesdrop or tam-
per with the messages flow. A security protocol, called also cryptographic
protocol, try to secure the communications over an insecure networks and to
provide security guarantees such as authentication of principals or secrecy of
exchanged messages through the application of cryptographic primitives.
3.1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
To communicate and to create messages, agents use a number of tools, or
cryptographic primitives. These basic primitives are the following.
Concatenation
The first type of cryptographic primitive is the concatenation of messages.
Message exchanged between principals can be seen as a concatenation of
smaller sub messages. Usually concatenation is indicated with the nota-
tion 〈M1.M2〉, with M1 and M2 sub messages. A defining properties of
concatenation is whatever it is associative or not, i.e.: 〈M1.〈M2.M3〉〉 ==
〈〈M1.M2〉.M3〉. Usually in this thesis we will assume associative concate-
nation and will write 〈M1.M2.M3〉 for 〈M1.〈M2.M3〉〉 or, equivalently,
〈〈M1.M2〉.M3〉.
Nonces
Nonce (abbreviation of Number used Once) are random unique identifiers
that provide the ability to differentiate between different sessions of the same
protocol. As long as not disclosed to another principals, a nonce is a secret
owned by that particular principal and cannot be guessed by any other prin-
cipals (honest or not).
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Cryptography
Cryptography is the practise and study of hiding information and is one of
the most fundamental part of a security protocol. Informally encryption is
the process of converting information (the plaintext, e.g.: a message) into an
intelligible form (the cipher text) and decryption is its reverse. Formally a
cipher is a pair of algorithm, a encryption algorithm and a decryption algo-
rithm (for some kind of cipher the encryption and decryption algorithms are
the same but its not the norm). The cipher operation depends on the plain-
text/cipher text to, respectively, encrypt/decrypt and on some keys. How
the keys are used by the ciphers classify them into symmetric or asymmetric
ciphers. Symmetric ciphers use the same key, K, for both the encryption and
the decryption process while in asymmetric cipher there are two distinct keys
one for encryption, K called public key, and its inverse, K−1 for decryption
called private key. Its important to note that, while we use the notation
K−1, in a sound asymmetric cipher, there is no way to compute it from K.
Applying the encryption algorithm to a plaintext, M , with a key, K,
result in cipher text, {M}K that is:
1 strongly dependent on the value of M and K;
2 cannot be inverted without the knowledge of the inverse key K−1 (for
simplicity sake in the case of a symmetric cipher we will assume that
K = K−1).
Point 2, called perfect cryptography, is a really strong assumption and
while no practical cipher enjoy this property, all ciphers try to at least make,
computationally, difficult to recover a plaintext without knowing the corre-
sponding keys. On a sound cipher (i.e.: the best way to recover a decryption
key is by brute–forcing) this is achieved by the use of a large enough key
space.
As a matter of fact cryptographic algorithms ensure a high degree of con-
fidence in exchanging messages over insecure communication channels. The
best-known symmetric cryptographic algorithms are the DES (Digital En-
cryption Standard) [FIP76] and the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
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[Sta02]. Meanwhile the best-known asymmetric algorithm is RSA (Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman) [RSA78].
Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic function that takes an ar-
bitrary block of data (e.g.: a message) and returns a fixed-size string, the
(cryptographic) hash value. Any accidental or intentional change to the data
will change the hash value. The ideal cryptographic hash function has four
main or significant properties:
• it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message;
• it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash;
• it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash;
• it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash.
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications,
notably in digital signatures. Know cryptographic hash function are MD5
(Message Digest 5) [132] and SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) [EJ01].
Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authen-
ticity of a message. It gives a recipient reason to believe that the message
was created by a known sender, and that it was not altered in transit.
Usually digital signature employ asymmetric encryption algorithm and
cryptographic hash function. A common way to create a digital signature of
a message M consist in the encryption of its hash, H(M), using a private
key, K. Any principals willing to check the signature, and so the authenticity
of a message, could decrypt the hash using the corresponding public key and
then check that the hash correspond to the sent message, since it is infeasible
to modify a message without changing its hash and the key used to encrypt
the message is private.
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3.1.2 A-B Notation
A common notation used in the specification of security protocols is the
so called A–B Notation, Alice-Bob Notation [CJ]. The notation has the
following formal syntax:
SpecAB ::= Message_Flow_List
Message_Flow_List ::= Message_Flow |
Message_Flow Message_Flow_List
Message_Flow ::= Party_Name "->" Principal_Name ":" Message_Spec
Message_Spec ::= Nonce | Message | "{"Message_Spec"}"Key_Name |
Message_Spec"."Message_Spec |
"f(" Message_Spec ")"
With Message, Nonce, Key_Name e Principal_Name elements of the sets
of, respectively, messages, nonces, keys, principal names.
This notation allow the specification of the expected execution of a pro-
tocol, i.e.: the exchanged messages. One of the main problem with this
notation and is that its limited only to the message flow, important details,
like the sharing of keys, are omitted or implicit.
An Example: the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
As an example of protocol specification using the A–B Notation consider the
Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol (NSPK):
1. A− > B : {NA.A}KB
2. B− > A : {NA.NB}KA
3. A− > B : {NB}KB
where A and B are the principals involved in the protocol; KA and
KB are the public keys of A and B, respectively; NA and NB are nonces
generated by A and B, respectively. Step (1) of the protocol models A
sending B a message with the identity of A and the nonce NA encrypted
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with KB, here the specification assume implicitly that B known KB−1 and
so could receive the sent message and learn the value of NA. In Step (2)
B send to A his nonce NB and the received the nonce NA proving its
participation to the protocol. The message is encrypted with KA so, like in
the first message, only A is able to decrypt the message and learn the value
NB. In Step (3) A concludes by proving to B her own participation in the
protocol. The protocol end with both party assured of the identity of each
other (i.e.: the protocol perform a mutual authentication).
3.1.3 Honest Agents and Intruder Models
As we said a cryptographic protocol is basically a communication protocol
defined over a certain number of participants, called agents, trying to assure a
secure communication. However there can be of two types of agents. Honest
agents, or principals, ”official” participants to the protocol, whose behaviour
is precise defined by the specification of protocol they execute, and rogue
agents, or intruders which don’t follows the protocol specification and try to
gain an unfair advantage over the hones agents (be it gaining knowledge of
secret messages, unauthorised authentication, . . . ).
While the behaviour of the principal is defined by the protocols itself
the behaviour of the intruder is defined by its intruder model. The most
famous intruder model is the one devised by Dolev and Yao in [DY83]. The
idea behind this intruder model (Dolev-Yao Intruder Model) is to give the
intruder the most resources possible without violating the assumption of per-
fect encryption, that is without permitting the intruder to decrypt a message
without knowing the necessary key. The Dolev-Yao intruder can intercept,
read and delay any message sent by an honest agent. In addition, it can
decompose any message acquired and use the knowledge obtained to con-
struct new messages. Is can also send messages, under any false identity.
The Dolev-Yao Intruder Model infact represent the worst case scenario for a
security protocol execution to the point it is normally associated to the idea
that the intruder is itself the communication channel.
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3.1.4 Channels
Messages exchange between protocols principals take place on communica-
tion channels. While generally abstracted from the protocol specification
(e.g.: the A–B Notation does not provide any facility to specify channels
characteristics) can be of fundamental importance for a sound specification.
The characteristic of a channel determine what the agent (honest or not) can
perform on the channel. There are various kind of channels:
• unsafe channels, the most common channel type, where communication
between principals is not assured i.e.: an intruder can perform all the
operation typical of the Dolev-Yao Intruder Model;
• safe channels, where communication between principal is safe from any
intruder;
• resilient channels, unsafe channels where, however, intruder cannot
block messages.
Specifying the kind of channels gives the ability to accurately model thing
like safe, out of the band, key exchange, wireless channels and so on.
3.1.5 Goals
Cryptographic protocol try to assure a secure communication. There are
many properties that may be required by a security protocol. The following
are the most common.
Secrecy
Intuitively, a security protocol assure secrecy if there is no way for the in-
truder to know some, secret, message. This can be simply accomplished via
encryption with an undisclosed (i.e.: not obtainable by the intruder) key.
A stronger version of secrecy, called non-interference, is the inability of the
intruder to indirectly know a secret. Consider for example a simple com-
munication protocol where all the possibles message are M1 and M2 (e.g.:
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buy item 1/2, vote for 1/2). The agent A sent his choice (M1 or M2) to
B encrypted with KB, B public key. Since only B has KB−1, the protocol
preserve the (weak) secrecy of the message, hoverer, since the intruder can
infer what message was sent by simply comparing the intercepted message
with all its possibles value (remember that the key KB is public) the protocol
does not preserve the strong secrecy.
Authentication
Intuitively, authentication is the ability for a principal to be sure of the iden-
tity of his correspondent. For example, a bank receiving an order for money
transfer checking for the identity of his client, a mail server checking the iden-
tity of the mail box owner. This is usually achieved by sending a nonce (that
in many real network protocol is the user name/password pair) encrypted
by the public key of the client. A problem common to many authentication
methods is their vulnerability to man in the middle attacks where an intruder
use a principals as an oracle to respond to an authentication request.
Non Repudiation/Anonymity
Non-repudiation ensure that a principal, in the event of dispute cannot, repu-
diate, or refute the fact of being the originator of a message. This is usually
achieved through the extensive use of digital signatures. Opposite to the
non repudiation is the anonymity where the security protocol assure that is
impossible to charge a principal as the originator of a message.
3.2 Timed Security Protocols
Security protocols where the explicit specification of temporal aspects is
needed to correctly to preserve their security properties are called Timed
Security Protocols. Aspects like:
• Delays and Timeouts: the ability to enter a recovery phase or ter-
minate the execution of a protocol or to delay an event,
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• Timed Messages: the ability to assign a temporal constraints on
the availability and usability of a messages (message disclosure and
expiration time). The use of timestamps (i.e.:the time at which an
event occurred),
• Channels Timings: the time that communication over a channel
takes to be performed and its subtle interaction with the intruder
model,
can affect the security of a protocol.
An Example: the Wide Mouthed Frog authentication protocol
For example consider the well known Wide Mouthed Frog authentication
protocol [BAN89]. The protocol involves three participants: Alice, Bob and
the Server. Alice sends a message to the Server containing the identity of
Bob (the intended receiver), a fresh session key Kab, and a timestamp TA,
encrypted with a symmetric key KAS, shared by Alice and the Server. The
Server then checks if the timestamp is recent and, if this is the case, forwards
the session key and a new timestamp TB to Bob, encrypted with a symmetric
key KBS, shared by Bob and the Server. Bob can now check if the timestamp
TS is recent and, if this is the case, accepts the session key as valid. Following
is a description of the protocol steps:
1. A→ S : A, {B,KAB, TA}KAS
2. S → B : {A,KAB, TS}KBS
The idea is that the participants use the timestamps to assess validity of
the session key (i.e.:a form of authentication). A session key should be con-
sidered valid if the associated timestamp is recent enough. The protocol is
known to be vulnerable to reply attacks, where an intruder simply repeatedly
intercepts the message sent by the Server and, exploiting the structural sim-
ilarity of the encrypted components in the two messages, repeatedly replies
it back to the Server, who interprets it as a request to establish a new ses-
sion key between the participants. If the intruder replies are fast enough,
47
it can succeed in forcing the Server to keep the timestamps updated indef-
initely, causing a, possibly compromised, session key to be associated to a
fresh timestamp.
Abstracting the time from the protocol, i.e.: removing the timestamps
and the communication channel timings, effectively changes the nature of the
protocol. This protocol will be one of the running examples in the following
chapters.
Timed Goals
Quantitative time information can be significative also for the security goals
that the protocol is trying to achieve. For example the secrecy of a message
could be needed in a precise time interval (e.g.: the secrecy of a tempo-
rary key, after the end of the protocol its secrecy is no more needed) or an
authentication must be completed in a determined time frame.
3.3 State of the Art
Limiting our interest to the verification of the secrecy in a security protocol
there is a number of works that have researched the problem.
Unfortunately, with no restrictions on the protocol this problem is unde-
cidable [EG82]. Limiting the protocols, by limiting the number of concurrent
sessions and/or the structure of the messages, a number of interesting decid-
ability result and tools appeared in bibliography.
Notably Gavin Lowe in [Low98] applied the FDR model checker to anal-
yse security protocols specified in CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes
[Hoa85], i.e.: an abstract language for modelling concurrent systems). Intu-
itively, the various protocol steps are modelled as processes that exchange
messages through channels. Also the intruder and the network are modelled
as CSP processes and channels are used to model both the intruder abilities
and important events in the protocol. In [CJM00] D. Clarke et al. developed
Brutus, a model checker that performed a depth-first search of the state graph
and implementing a message derivation mechanism modelling the intruder’s
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capabilities. This two approaches, and others based on explicit state model
checker, suffer from the state explosion problem. Limiting a priori the size of
messages, and the number of nonces exchanged as well as using partial order
techniques the authors have partially address that problem. Differently from
explicit state model checker the tools Athena [Son99] and CASRUL [JRV00]
both use symbolic state exploration, one in the backward from the security
goal to the initial state (Athena), the other forward (CASRUL). The problem
with this approaches was that as a semi-decision methods they always end
on unsafe protocols but can loop indefinitely without proving the security
of the protocol. Also the use of symbolic methods make the production of
counterexamples more complex and time consuming.
The AVISPA Framework
The AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security-sensitive Protocols
and Applications [ABB+05]) Framework is a push-button tool for the auto-
mated validation of security protocols. This framework provide a high level
specification language and number of different verification engines.
HLPSL
The idea behind the High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL)
was to provide protocol engineers with a convenient, human readable, and
easy to use language easily translatable into a lower-level formalism well-
suited for implementation into model-checking tools.
The HLPSL language derive part of its syntax from the TLA logic,
modelling a protocol by describing its actual state and how this state change.
The language allow the use of typed variables, the structuring of the spec-
ification using a kind of procedural abstraction, provide the ability to express
common cryptographic primitives (concatenation, encryption, hashing) and
allow to specify the goals that a protocol specification must satisfy.
In a HLPSL specification the global state of a protocol is defined by an
assignment of values to all the system variables. First order logic formulae
on state variables are called state predicate. The evolution from a state to
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another is described by logic formulae called transition predicates that bind
the value of the variables in the current state to the value in the next state.
The variables of the next state are called primed ; given a variable X, with
X we denote its value in the current state and with X ′ (X primed) its value
after the transition.
An HLPSL specification is composed by a series of roles, a modular
template for the behaviour of the principals of the protocols.
AHLPSL specification is described by the following grammar in (var ident
are the variables of the language):
SpecHPSL ::= role_definition_list
[goal_Declaration]
main_role_call
role_definition_list ::= role_definition | role_definition_list
role_definition ::= basic_role | composition_role
main_role_call ::= var_ident "()"
goal_declaration ::= ...
A specification in HLPSL can be partitioned into transition roles (called
also basic role) and composition roles, followed by a call to a particular
composition role called main role and, eventually, by the goal specification.
Transition role definition 1
Transition role definition 2
...
Transition role definition n
Composition role definition 1
Composition role definition 2
...
Composition role definition n
Main composition role call
Goals declaration
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The Intruder
A HLPSL specification allows, like the A-B notation, to models the expected
execution of a protocol but, differently from the A-B notation, implies the
presence of an intruder.
In HLPSL to every communication channel (intuitively the media that
the principals use to exchange the messages) can be associated a different in-
truder model the determine the power that the intruder have on that partic-
ular channel. At moment the, only, allowed intruder model is the Dolev-Yao
intruder model.
The intruder in HLPSL as well as being implicitly present on the com-
munication channels can be explicitly referenced during the instantiation of
a role, using the constant i, in this way is possible to model sessions where
there is an explicit communication between the principals and the intruder.
In this way the intruder can possibly enrich his knowledge of the protocol
and use this knowledge to build attacks on the protocol.
Types and Variables: Base Types
In the roles is possible to define the variables that will be used in the protocol
specification, also the roles can be parametrised.
HLPSL is a typed language, there are many different types and for some
types additional attributes can be used to specify additional features. The
base types of the language are:
- agent variables identify the principals of the protocols. HLPSL define
the particular agent variables, i, to explicitly model the intruder;
- public key and symmetric key variables models the keys used for, re-
spectively, asymmetric (public key) cryptography and symmetric cryp-
tography. Given a public key k, the corresponding private key is de-
noted by inv(k). Given a key k and a text variable m {m} k is the
encryption of the variable m with the key k. Given {m} k the decryp-
tion is possible if the principal knows k, if symmetric, or inv(k), if
asymmetric;
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- text or msg variables represent the messages that the principals ex-
change during the protocol run. Variables of type text (fresh) (where
textttfresh is an attribute of the type) subjected to priming are used
to represent the nonces of the protocol;
- nat variables represent the natural numbers;
- bool variables represent the Boolean values;
- function variables represent non invertible function on the space of
messages. This kind of variable is used to model one way hash func-
tions. Given a variable a of type function with a(X) we denote a value
of type msg, i.e.: the application of the function a to X. A principal (or
the intruder) knowing only a(X) cannot obtain X;
- channel variables models the communication channels.
The syntax used to declare a variable is the following:
var_decl_list ::= exists var_decl{"," var_decl }
var_decl ::= var_ident {"," var_ident} ":" base_type_name["("attr_name")"]
base_type_name ::= "agent" | "public_key" | "symmetric_key" |
"text" | "nat" | "bool" | "function" |
"channel" | "msg"
attr_name ::= "fresh" | "dy"
To declare a variable, x of type t we use the expression exists x : t; its
possible to declare multiple variables on same line by sepatating them by a
comma eg.: exists x1, x2 : t. A similar syntax is used to declare the
list of the parameters of a role.
Structured Types
The basic types can be structured in three different ways :
- tuple;
- lists and sets;
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- functions and mappings on messages.
The general grammar is the following:
var_decl_list ::= "exists" var_decl{"," var_decl } |
"local" var_decl{"," var_decl }
var_decl ::= var_ident {"," var_ident} ":" type_name["("attr_name")"]
type_name ::= subtype_of | subtype_of "->" subtype_of
subtype_of ::= base_type_name |
subtype_of "list"|
subtype_of "set"|
"(" subtype_of {"," subtype_of} ")"
base_type_name ::= "agent" | "public_key" | "symmetric_key" |
"text" | "nat" | "bool" | "function" |
"channel"
For example, (1, 2, 3, 4) is a tupla whose type is (nat,nat,nat,nat),
(a, 1, 2, b) have type (bool,nat,nat,public key) if a is a bool and b is
a public key. A list of naturals is defined with exists IntList: nat
list, similarly with the keyword set we can define a set of naturals. The
list can be initialized like IntList = [], element are added to the list using
the operator cons, e.g.: IntList’=cons(10,IntList).
HLPSL allow the definition of two different types of functions: functions
on messages and mappings. The main difference between the two types
of functions is that functions on the messages are constant, i.e.: enjoy the
property that once defined do not change their value during the execution
of the protocol, which is the case of the mappings. For example, a function
on messages that associates names with numbers: F: text -> nat initialise
with F = [(A, 1), (B, 2)] (1 is associated to A and 2 to B) will not change
once initialised and for all the duration of the protocol F (A) = 1.
The mappings are defined and initialised in a manner identical to the
functions on messages with exception that at any time you can add elements
using the mapping operation, for example F ’(X) = 3 add (or change) the
mapping between X and 3.
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HLPSL Roles
A role in HLPSL is a description of the behaviour of a principal. A role can
be parametrised and have local variables. There are two types of role, the
transition roles that describe the actions of a principal and the composition
role consisting of the instantiation of one or more of role. The composition
roles allow the structuring of the specification.
A role definition is composed by the declaration of its name, any formal
parameters and, in the case of a transition role, a player declaration that
binds an agent passed as parameter to the role; the agent tells you who
is executing the role. The formal parameters are declared using the same
syntax used to declare local variables in a role.
Following there are the, optionals, role headers :
- the declaration of the local variables (using the exists/local opera-
tor);
- the declaration of the starting state (using the init operator) speci-
fying the initial values of the local variables of the role. For example
given a variable of nat type X, init X = 0 sets its value to 0. Set or list
variables can be initialised using the operator /\_ that allow iteration
on all the element of the set es: init /\_ {in(IT,X)} IT = 0 set all
the element of X to 0;
- the declaration of the accepting states for the role using the accept
operator. The operator define fir a transition role a predicate that
identify the accepting state of the role;
- the declaration of the initial knowledge of the role using the operator
knowledge. The initial knowledge allow to specify messages know by
a principal before the start of the protocol, e.g.: public, private keys,
share keys. It can also be used to specify the intruder initial knowledge,
i.e.: already. With A agent variables and k public key variables,
knowledge(A) = { k, inv(k) } state that the agent A knows the key
k and its inverse inv(k);
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- the declaration of owned variables using the own operator; while in
HLPSL is possible to share variables between roles, an own declaration
in a role state that a role will be the only one to modify that variable;
- the transition section (is we are in a transition role) or the composition
section (is we are in a composition role).
The following syntax is used for the roles specification:
role_definition ::= basic_role | composition_role basic_role ::=
role_declaration player_def role_header
[transition_declaration]
"end role"
composition_role ::= role_declaration role_header
[composition_declaration]
"end role"
role_declaration ::= "role" var_ident "(" parameter_list ")"
played_def ::= "played_by" var_ident role_header ::= "def ="
[exists_declaration]
[owns_declaration]
[init_declaration]
[accept_declaration]
[knowledge_declaration]
exists_declaration ::= "exists" var_decl{"," var_decl }
owns_declaration ::= "owns" var_decl{"," var_decl }
init_declaration ::= "init" init_declaration_list
init_declaration_list ::= var_ident "=" expression [init_declaration_list] |
"/\_{" parameter_list "}" var_ident "=" expression
accept_declaration ::= "accept" predicate
knowledge_declaration := "knowledge("var_ident")" "={ expression "}"
parameter_list ::= var_decl
Transition section
The state of a role is the value of all its non primed variables (state vari-
ables). A state predicate is a logical formula over state variables and con-
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stants (e.g.: S = 2). A transition predicate is a logical formula over state
variables, constants, and variables subjected to priming (e.g.: S = 2 /\ X’ =
1). The transition predicates model the evolution of the protocol while the
state predicates constrain it.
A transition section has the following syntax:
transition_declaration ::= "transition" transition_list
transition_list ::= transition [transition_list]
transition ::= label "." state_predicate "--|>" transition_predicate_list |
label "." state_predicate "=|>" transition_predicate_list
A transition role is composed by a transition section that contains one or
more transitions with the following form:
label . State Predicate︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
--|> Action︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
or
label . State Predicate︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
=|> Action︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
There are two different kind of state transition, the spontaneous tran-
sitions (denoted by --|>) and instantaneous transitions (=|>). Transitions
connect a predicate on the left side (LHS) with an action on right side (RHS);
spontaneous transitions, i.e.: A -|> B, indicates that if the predicate A is
satisfied by the current state then it is possible to move to the state described
by B, the principals, however, is not forced to change state and can delay
the transition. Conversely, the immediate transition has the property that
the transition is executed immediately when the predicate on the LHS is
satisfiable.
The LHS of a transition has the following syntax:
state_predicate ::= formula ["/\" state_predicate] |
var_ident"(" expression_list ")" ["/\" state_predicate] |
var_ident"(start)"
formula ::= expression "=" expression |
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expression "<" expression |
"in(" expression "," expression ")" |
"not(" expression "=" expression ")" |
"not in(" expression "," expression ")" |
expression "/=" expression |
"true" |
"false"
expression_list ::= expression [expression_list]
expression ::= var_ident"’" |
"inv("expression")" |
expression "." expression |
"{" expression "}" expression |
"(" expression ")" |
"var_ident(" expression_list ")" |
"const_ident(" expression_list ")" |
"cons(" expression "," expression ")" |
var_ident |
const_ident |
"[]" |
"[" expression_list "]"
The LHS of a transition is a predicate on the role state where is possible
to:
- test for equality and inequality two variables, A = B, not( X = Y);
- use the inequality operator on nat variables, X <4;
- test lists ans sets for the presence of elements, in(X, 1);
- receive a message on a channel (details are given in a following section).
The above operations can be composed using the conjunction operator, /\.
The LHS denote for with states the transition will be executed and the
action described in the RHS performed.
The RHS of a transition has the following syntax:
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transition_predicate_list ::= transition_predicate "/\"
transition_predicate_list
transition_predicate ::= var_ident "’=" expression |
var_ident"’(" argument ")" "=" expression |
"var_ident(" expression_list ")" |
"const_ident(" expression_list ")"
Its possible to:
- modify a variable e.g: A’ = 2;
- send a message on a channel (details are given in a following section).
The above operations can be composed using the conjunction operator, /\.
Also transitions can be labelled.
For example the following transition:
t1. S = 1 /\ RCV(M) =|> S’ = 2 /\ SND(X)
Declare a transition labelled t1 that specify that, when the variable S is
equal to 1 and on the channel RCV is available a message unifiable with M,
assign to S the value 2 and send on the channel SND the message X.
Composition section
Roles of type composition instantiate other transition or composition roles.
Composition between roles can be sequential, using the ; operator, or
parallel with interleaving semantic, using the /\ operator. The role hierarchy
is closed by a top level role, not parametrised, that is called at the end of the
specification.
A composition section have the following syntax:
composition_declaration ::= "composition" composition_list
composition_list ::= composition |
"/\_{" parameter_instance "}" composition
composition ::= role_instance [/\ composition]
role_instance ::= "(" role_instance ")" |
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role_instantiation ";" role_instance |
role_instantiation
role_instantiation ::= var_ident"(" arguments ")"
arguments ::= var_ident [, arguments ]
An example of composition could be the following:
role C( ... ) def=
composition
A1( ... ) /\ B1( ... )
A2( ... ) ; B2( ... )
end role
Where role A1 and B1 are executed sequentially while A2 and B2 in parallel.
Channels Operations
Communications between the principals of a protocol in HLPSL occur along
channels. These communications are asynchronous and the process of send-
ing on a channel is instantaneous and independent from any receipt. The
channels acts as a unlimited buffer.
Channels operations syntax is the following:
expression_list ::= expression [expression_list]
expression ::= ...
"var_ident(" expression_list ")"
...
transition_predicate_list ::= transition_predicate
["/\" transition_predicate_list]
transition_predicate ::= ...
"var_ident(" expression_list ")" |
...
An operation on a channel is interpreted differently if located on the LHS
or RHS of a transition. On the LHS of a transition its interpreted as a receive
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operation on the channel (e.g.: RCV(Msg) with RCV a channel variable). On
the RHS of a transition its interpreted as a send operation on the channel.
A receive operations on a channel state the message structure that will be
accepted. A receive operation will be successful, allowing its transition to fire,
if the message received conform to the structure (i.e.: is unifiable)specified
in the receive operation.
Side effect of a receive operation is the binding of role variables with parts
of the received messages.
For example:
role A( ... ) ...
exists X : text,
Y : public_key,
State : nat;
init State = 0;
transition
State=0 / RCV(X’.Y) =|> ...
end role
The receive operation RCV(X’.Y) denote a template of the messages that
can be received, in particular Y denote that all the messages must end with
the public key Y; as a side effect to the, primed, variable X, will be binded
the first part of the received message.
In HLPSL is possible to specify properties of the channel used by adding
a parameter to its type definition. Currently the only channel type imple-
mented is of type Dolev-Yao (channel(dy)).
Goals
HLPSL also provides the ability to specify the goals that must be satisfied
by the protocol. Currently, you can specify authentication and secrecy re-
quirements. The authentication requirements between two role constrain the
roles to agree on the value of a specific variable. The secrecy requirements
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constrain the value of a variable to be known only to role to which it belongs
and, in particular, to be unknown to the intruder. HLPSL also provides the
ability to specify constraints on the protocol in LTL.
HLPSL Example: NSPK
A possible encoding in HLPSL of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Pro-
tocol presented in section 3.1.2 is the following:
1 role A( a, b : agent, ka, kb : public_key, SND, RVC : chanel(dy) )
2 played_by a def =
3 exist state : nat
4 na : text(fresh),
5 nb : text
6
7 knowledge(a) = { inv(ka) }
8
9 init state = 0
10
11 transition
12
13 1. state = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|> state’ = 1 /\ SND({na’.a}_kb)
14 2. state = 1 /\ RCV({nb’}_inv(ka)) =|> state’ = 2
15 end role
16
17 role B( a, b : agent, ka, kb : public_key, SND, RVC : chanel(dy) )
18 played_by b def =
19 exist state : nat
20 na : text,
21 nb : text(fresh)
22
23 knowledge(b) = { inv(kb) }
24
25 init state = 0
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26
27 transition
28
29 1. state = 0 /\ RCV(na’.a)_inv(kb) =|> state’ = 1 /\ SND({na’.nb’}_ka)
30 end role
31
32 role Session( ) def=
33 exist a, b : agent,
34 ka, kb : public_key
35 RCV, SND : chanel
36 composition
37 A( a, b, ka, kb, SND, RCV ) /\ B( a, b, ka, kb, RCV, SND )
38 end role
39
40 Session( )
The specification begin with the definition of the role A, its important
to note among its formal parameters the declaration of the two communi-
cation channels SND and RCV of type chanel(dy). Following there is the
declaration of the role local variables, lines 3-5, among them a nonce (typed
text(fresh)) na. At line 7 there is the declaration of the initial knowledge
of the role; this principals know the inverse, inv(ka), of the key ka passed
as a parameter. The variable state is initialised at line 9. At lines 13-14
there is the transition section declaration describing the behaviour of this
role; the sent and received messages are the same described in section 3.1.2
using the A-B Notation, just note the use of RCV(start) to define the start
of the protocol. Similarly, from line 17 to 30, there is the definition of the
role B describing the other principal of the protocol. The declared roles are
parametric and must be instantiated to define the desired protocol execution.
At line 32-38 a composition role, Session, create an istance of the role A and
B using the opportune parameters; it’s important to note that the channel
variables passed as role parameters, SND e RCV, are passed in inverted order
to the role B if compared to the role A; this way what is sent by A along
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channel SND is received on the channel RCV and, on the contrary what is sent
by B along the channel RCV is received on the channel SND.
At line 40 the role hierarchy is closed by the call to the composition role
Session.
AVISPA Verification Engines
In the AVISPA Framework the HLPSL language is paired with a number
of verification engines providing different ways to verify the same protocol.
• The On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) [BMV05] performs protocol
falsication and bounded verication by exploring the protocol state space
in a demand-driven way. OFMC implements a number of correct and
complete symbolic techniques. It supports the specification of alge-
braic properties of cryptographic operators (e.g.: exclusive or between
messages), and typed and untyped protocol models;
• The Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) [CV02] applies
constraint solving with some powerful simplification heuristics and re-
dundancy elimination techniques;
• The SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) [AC04] builds a proposi-
tional formula encoding a bounded unrolling of the transition relation
specified by the protocol. The propositional formula is then fed to a
state-of-the-art SAT solver and any model found is translated back into
an attack;
• The TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for
the Analysis of Security Protocols) [BHK08] approximates the intruder
knowledge by using regular tree languages and rewriting. For secrecy
properties, TA4SP can show whether a protocol is flawed (by under-
approximation) or whether it is safe for any number of sessions (by
over-approximation).
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Timed Security Protocols Verification
The idea of using formal methods to prove time dependent security properties
is not new (e.g., see [BFST02, GLM03, NPP04, CSHM07, DG04]). A number
of those papers relies on low level formalism as specification language. For
example in [BFST02] the authors develop a theory of “non-interference” to
prove security property in concurrent systems modeled as timed automata.
The papers does not consider explicitly security protocols or issues like mod-
eling encryption or other common primitives of security protocols.
Extending the low-level formalism of the Timed Automata, [NPP04] pro-
vide the ability to express parallelism and synchronisation on structured
messages built over cryptographic primitives, allowing for a more convenient
way to model security protocols that Timed Automata. Similarly, [GLM03]
employ a timed process algebra as the specification language for security pro-
tocols. Both approaches require the designer to explicitly model the timing
aspects of protocols, as neither Timed Automata nor timed process algebra
provide, high level, timed protocol specific construct as the ones presented
above. In [CSHM07] the authors use the timed automata (in the form of
XTAs) as modelling language but, contrary to the ones above, they give an
explicitly representation of the intruder as a timed automaton and a fine
grained representation of cryptography and nonce generations; while using a
higher level formalism, the fine grained approach to the protocol modelling
(requiring explicit specification of nonce generation and cryptography oper-
ations) show how problematic is protocol modelling using only formal/low
level languages. In [DG04] the authors use constraint programming combined
with symbolic exploration to analyse infinite protocols with explicit use of
timestamps (in particular the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol). In [BL02] the
authors using finite-state model checking and abstraction technique verify
the TESLA protocol in an untimed setting.
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Chapter 4
Timed Security Protocols
In this chapter we focus on the problem of specifying and verifying security
protocols where temporal aspects directly affect the correctness of the proto-
col, and, therefore, need to be explicitly considered both in the specification
and the verification. In section 4.1 we will present three timed protocols
showing the temporal aspects that are needed to correctly model them. In
section 4.1.4 we will present an extension of the, state of art, modelling lan-
guage HLPSL for these kinds of protocols and present in section 4.1.4 we
will account for its formal semantics.
4.1 Timed Protocols Examples
Most of the proposed protocol specification languages and verification tech-
niques are limited to cryptographic protocols where quantitative temporal
information is not crucial (e.g. delay, timeout, timed disclosure or expira-
tion of information do not affect the correctness of the protocol), and details
about some low level timing aspects of the protocol are abstracted away
(e.g. timestamps, duration of channel delivery etc). Examples of time sen-
sitive protocols are, for instance, the non-repudiation Zhou-Gollmann pro-
tocol [ZG97], the TESLA authentication protocol [PCTS02] and the well
known Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [BAN89].
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4.1.1 Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
Already presented in section 3.2 for the sake of clarity we will repeat here
its detail, the Wide Mouther Frog Protocol is a well known authentication
protocol.
The protocol involves three participants: Alice, Bob and the Server. Alice
sends a message to the Server containing the identity of Bob (the intended
receiver), a fresh session key Kab, and a timestamp TA, encrypted with a
symmetric key KAS, shared by Alice and the Server. The Server then checks
if the timestamp is recent and, if this is the case, forwards the session key and
a new timestamp TB to Bob, encrypted with a symmetric key KBS, shared
by Bob and the Server. Bob can now check if the timestamp TS is recent and,
if this is the case, accepts the session key as valid. Following is a description
of the protocol steps:
1. A→ S : A, {B,KAB, TA}KAS
2. S → B : {A,KAB, TS}KBS
The idea is that the participants use the timestamps to assess validity
of the session key (i.e.:a form of authentication). A session key should be
considered valid if the associated timestamp is recent enough.
Timed Features in the Wide Mother Frog Protocol
To correctly model the protocol we need the ability to:
• model the use of the timestamp exchanged by the principals;
• model timing in both principals action and channels.
Abstracting the time from the protocol, i.e.: removing the timestamps
and the communication channel timings, effectively changes the nature of the
protocol. Abstracting time, what remain of the protocol is effectively safe.
However its possible to show that in a, realistic, timed setting the protocol
is unsafe. Infact the protocol is known to be vulnerable to reply attacks,
where an intruder simply repeatedly intercepts the message sent by the Server
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A S I B
A, {B,Kab, TA}KAS
{A,Kab, TS}KBS
B, {A,Kab, TS}KBS
{B,Kab, T ′S}KAS
A, {B,Kab, T ′S}KAS
{A,Kab, T ′′S}KBS
Figure 4.1: A possible attack trace on the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
and, exploiting the structural similarity of the encrypted components in the
two messages, repeatedly replies it back to the Server, who interprets it
as a request to establish a new session key between the participants. If
the intruder replies are fast enough, it can succeed in forcing the Server to
keep the timestamps updated indefinitely, causing a, possibly compromised,
session key to be associated to a fresh timestamp. Figure 4.1 show a possible
attack trace on the WMF protocol.
4.1.2 TESLA Authentication Protocol
The TESLA protocol [PCTS02] is an authentication protocol developed for
multicast authentication over an unreliable channel. There are many variant
of this protocol [LN03] and its low communication and computation overhead
and tolerance to packet loss allow its application ranges from authenticated
audio/video steaming to sensor networks to vehicular networks.
What distinguishes it from other types of cryptographic protocols is its
peculiar use of timing to provide authentication. Usual authentication pro-
tocols relies on the heavy use of public key cryptography which is difficult in
scenarios where devices with low computational and networking power are
used, or where the efficiency of networking throughput is relevant.
In the TESLA protocol, however, authentication is provided by using only
symmetric keys, hash-functions and loose time synchronisation. Indeed, the
receiver is assumed to know an upper bound on the difference between the
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sender and the receiver local time, namely the maximum time synchronisa-
tion error.
A simple algorithm providing loose time synchronisation is the one de-
scribed in ([PCTS02] pag. 4-6):
• Setup: The sender S has a asymmetric encryption key pair, with the
private key K−1S and the public key KS. The receiver have saved its
current local time tr. We assume public keys to be pre distributed
between the principals.
• Protocol steps :
1. R→ S : N
2. S → R : {ts, N}K−1S
Where N is a random and unpredictable nonce. And ts is the sender,
S, local time. The receiver verifies the digital signature and checks that the
nonce in the packet equals the nonce it randomly generated. If the message
is authentic the receiver computes t− tr + ts that is an upper bound on the
current sender’s time.
Moreover, packet loss resilience can also be achieved by functionally re-
lating the keys used by the protocol in a one-way hash chain. Intuitively,
from a single starting secret key a chain of keys is generated by successive
applications of a hash function. From any element of the chain and the hash
function, any of the following keys can then be generated. This mechanism
is a common cryptographic primitive [Lam81], and is used, for example, in
the well know S/KEY one-time password system [Hal94].
In the following, we present two versions of the TESLA protocol. The
first one is the basic scheme, which ensures packet authentication under the
hypothesis of channel reliability (i.e., no packets get lost), while the second
version is more robust and guarantees packet authentication also under the
hypothesis of packet loss.
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Packet # P0 P1 P2 . . . Pi Pi+1 . . .
Disclosed Key − K0 K1 . . . Ki−1 Ki . . .
Key CommitmentF (K1) F (K2) F (K3) . . . F (Ki+2)F (Ki+3) . . .
Intervals
T0 T1 T2 . . . Ti Ti+1Tint
Figure 4.2: The time intervals of the TESLA protocol
Basic TESLA Scheme
The basic scheme of the protocol involves two kinds of agent: a sender,
which broadcasts a stream of packets, and many receivers, which need to
authenticate the delivered packets.
One fundamental assumption in the design of the protocol is that, while
the sender has enough computational power to execute complex operations,
the receivers may not have, and that the sender and the receivers are loosely
time synchronised.
The idea behind the protocol is quite simple. The sender splits the data
stream into uniform intervals, by choosing a time interval size Tint and the
number of intervals, so that a single packet is sent within each time interval.
We assume that the first time interval starts at time T0, the second interval
at time T1 = T0 + Tint, and so on. The packet sent in each time interval is
signed using a key which is kept secret by the sender during the current time
interval, and which is disclosed in a packet delivered in the following interval,
as shown in Figure 4.2. The receivers can then use the information contained
in later packets to authenticate earlier packets. To ensure that the packets
cannot be forged, the disclosure of the keys is scheduled in such a way that,
by the time a key is received, all the packets signed with that key must have
been already buffered by the receivers. Since the sender and the receivers are
loosely time synchronised, the receivers can estimate the scheduling of the
packets and act accordingly.
The scheduling of the time intervals, their length, the packet size, and
the key disclosure delays must be somehow known both to the sender and
the receivers. This is achieved by either including those data into the first
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bootstrapping packet sent by sender, or by assuming some predefined values.
For the bootstrapping packet some common authentication method is used,
such as public key cryptography 1.
Each packet includes, besides the payload, a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), a disclosed key and a key commitment. The MAC included
in each packet is obtained by applying a known MAC function with a sym-
metric key to the concatenation of the payload, the disclosed key and the
key commitment. The key disclosed in the packet is the one used to com-
pute the MAC signature of the packet sent in the previous interval, while
the key commitment is the result of applying a hash function F to the key
which will be used to compute the MAC of the packet in the next interval.
By knowing the key commitment and the hash function F , the receiver can
check whether the key disclosed in the next packet is indeed the key used to
sign the previous payload.
In the following, S and R are the sender and a receiver, respectively,
Tint is the interval length, and ∆ is the maximum time synchronisation error
between the sender and the receiver. In addition, MAC is a cryptographically
sound (i.e., non invertible) MAC function, F is a cryptographically sound
hash-function, and PK(S) is the sender public key.
0a. R −→ S : nR
0b. S −→ R : {F (k1).nR}PK(S)
...
i. S −→ R : Di .MAC(ki, Di) with Di = (Mi.F (ki+1).ki−1)
Following is a detailed description of each step of the protocol. With step
0a, the receiver starts a new session by sending a fresh nonce nR to the sender.
With step 0b, the sender replies to the receiver with the same nonce together
with a commitment F (k1) to the first key used. The message is signed using
the public key PK(S) of the sender. The use of public key cryptography and
of a fresh nonce allows to guarantee the receiver that the legitimate sender
1This requirement can indeed be relaxed as shown in [LN03]
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is starting a new protocol session. In addition, the receiver gains knowledge
of the first key commitment which will be used to authenticate the first key.
The receiver is therefore guaranteed, by the replied and the use of, that the
legitimate sender is starting a new protocol session and know the first key
commitment used to authenticate the first key.
In each step i, with i ≥ 1, every packet contains the concatenation of a
message Di and of the MAC of the current message Di with respect to the key
ki. Message Di is, in turn, the concatenation of the following messages: the
payload Mi, the commitment F (ki+1) to the key used in the next interval, and
the key ki−1 used to generate the MAC of the message sent in the previous
step i− 1.
Notice that the packet sent in the protocol step i = 1 contains a bogus
key, since the packet in Step 0b has no payload.
Since both functions MAC and F are cryptographically sound, after re-
ceiving a packet, a receiver cannot immediately verify the validity of the
MAC and, therefore, cannot immediately authenticate the received packet
as originating from the sender.
On the other hand, the receiver has to immediately check that the re-
ceiving time of the current packet is compatible with the scheduling, namely
that the key used to sign the current packet is not yet disclosed. This is done
by checking the following condition:
b(Tc + ∆− T0)/Tintc = i (4.1)
where Tc is the local receiver time and T0 is the protocol start time.
2.
To fully authenticate a received packet, the receiver has to wait until the
sender discloses the corresponding key in the next time interval. A receiver
can authenticate packet pi, received in step i ≥ 1, if the previous packet pi−1
and next packet pi+1 have been received, and the following conditions (called
the TESLA security condition) hold:
2In its general form, TESLA allows for authenticating a message after up to d intervals
(with d ≥ 1). For simplicity sake the version of Condition (4.1) we consider here is a
simplified version where we assume d = 1 (meaning the next interval).
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1. pi−1 is an authenticated packet;
2. the key disclosed in pi+1 (i.e., ki) is the same key committed to in packet
pi−1. In other words, if c is the commitment received in pi−1, it has to
check whether F (ki) = c;
3. the application of the MAC function MAC, with respect to the key
disclosed in pi+1, to the concatenation of the payload, the disclosed key
and the key commitment of packet pi, yields the MAC component of
pi.
Condition (1) is handled differently for the first packet since it is the only
one which uses public key cryptography for authentication. Notice that, in
this scheme the loss of a packet causes not only the loss of a useful payload,
but also the loss of a key. This prevents the ability to authenticate the
previously received packet.
Second Scheme
To overcome the problem mentioned above, and make the protocol loss toler-
ant, the sender can chain the used keys. In other words, the sender generates
a random key kN and generates the other keys by successive applications of
a cryptographically sound hash function H to kN . Therefore, the second key
is kN−1 = H(kN), the third key is kN−2 = H(H(kN)) = H(kN−1), and so on.
In this way, a receiver can compute any key at position i in the chain just
by knowing some key at position greater than i in the chain.
The drawback of this scheme is that the sender must precompute all the
keys in advance so as to to schedule their disclosure in the appropriate packet.
Being able to compute a key from any subsequently received key make
superfluous including the commitment in each packet. Using the commitment
included in the initial authenticated packet, F (K1), a receiver can check the
validity of the i-sh key received by checking that F (K1) = F (H
i(KN)). The
starting commitment, chaining the keys, work as a commitment to the entire
key chain.
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The protocol, written in A-B notation, is similar to the one for the first
scheme. The only relevant differences are in the structure of the messages
sent at steps i ≥ 1, and in the definition of the TESLA security condition.
Each step i (with i ≥ 1) is replaced with:
i′. S −→ R : Di .MAC(ki, Di) with Di = (Mi.ki−1)
Assuming that the receiver has received and authenticated packet pv (with
v < i), and received packet pi+d (with d > 0), conditions (2) and (3) of the
TESLA security condition for authenticating pi become:
(2′) the key disclosed in pi+d (i.e., ki+d−1) is the (i + d − 1)-th key of the
chain committed to in packet p0. In other words, it is necessary to
check whether F (H i+d−1(ki+d−1)) = c0, where c0 is the key commitment
enclosed in the message of step 0b;
(3′) the application of the MAC function MAC, with respect to the key used
in the (possibly lost) packet pi+1 (which corresponds to H
d−1(ki+d−1)),
to the message components sent in packet pi, yields the MAC compo-
nent of pi.
Timed Features in the TESLA Protocol
While there are works that show TESLA safety in an untimed setting [Arc02],
the use of a time friendly notation make its specification simpler. In partic-
ular we need the ability to:
• a way to model the splitting of the packet stream into intervals;
• a way to check the TESLA security condition (e.g.: the keys disclosure).
4.1.3 Zhou-Gollmann efficient Non Repudiation Pro-
tocol
Non-repudiation protocols are concerned with preventing a principal to deny,
repudiate, having been involved in some communication.
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In particular the Zhou-Gollmann efficient Non Repudiation Protocol (ZGNRP)
[ZG97] is interesting for its peculiar dependence on time.
There are many variants of the protocol. All describe a protocol that
allows two participants exchange messages while protecting each party of
the transaction against the other party that, in the case of a dispute, denies
the occurrence of an action. In this protocol, the principal, Alice, must send
a message to another participant, Bob, the purpose of the protocol is to
ensure that Alice can not, at any time, deny having sent the message to Bob
and vice versa, Bob can not deny having received the message from Alice.
The protocol allow the principals to acquire irrefutable evidences of the
actions.
What the protocol try to ensure is a fairness property: at any time the
protocol end with a principal having an advantage over the other, in partic-
ular, with a principal unable to prove the receipt/send of a message.
The protocol require the presence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that
acting as a delivery authority and is providing services needed to keep the
fairness of the protocol.
Each correct run of the protocol allow each principals to collect the fol-
lowing transmission evidences:
• Non-repudiation of origin (NRO): Bob, communicating with Alice, has
obtained an irrefutable evidence that the origin of the message is indeed
Alice; Alice, in the case of a dispute, cannot deny to have sent the
message to Bob;
• Non-repudiation of receipt (NRR): Alice, communicating with Bob, has
obtained an irrefutable evidence that the message was received by Bob;
Bob, in the case of a dispute, cannot deny to have received a message
from Alice;
The fairness property is verified if every time a participant have the NRO
evidence the other have the NRR evidence and vice versa.
The idea behind the protocol is to split the message M in half, a key K
and a commitment C = {M}K . The commitment is sent to Bob while the
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key is sent to the TTP that is responsible for its distribution to the parties
together with a receipt. The receipt (CON) provided by the TTP is part of
the NRO and NRR and can be used to solve an eventual dispute.
An important temporal aspect of the protocol is the guarantees that the
principals always finish the protocol after a certain, predetermined, finite
amount of time T during which the TTP assure to keep the key.
Let:
• M the message to send;
• K symmetric key;
• C Commitment, M encrypted with K;
• SA A private key;
• SB B private key;
• STTP TPP private key;
• fEOO flag Evidence of Origin;
• fEOR flag Evidence of Receipt;
• fSUB flag Evidence of Submission;
• fCON flag Evidence of Confirmation;
• L nonce;
• T predetermined timeout;
• EOO = sSA(fEOO, B, L, T, C), sk(m) is the signature of m using the
private key k;
• EOR = sSB(fEOR, A, L, T, C);
• subK = sSA(fSUB, B, L,K);
• conK = sSTTP (fCON , A,B, L,K).
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The protocol, in A-B notation, is the following:
1 A→ B : fEOO, B, L, T, C,EOO
2 B → A : fEOR, A, L,EOR
3 A→ TTP : fSUB, B, L, T,K, subK
4 B ↔ TTP : fCON , A,B, L,K, conK
4’ A↔ TTP : fCON , A,B, L,K, conK
In step 1, Alice has sent the commitment to Bob, Bob has not the mes-
sage still as he is lacking the key K so the property of fairness continues to be
maintained. Similarly in step 2, the sending to Alice of a message confirming
the correct receiving of the commitment from Bob does not change the fair-
ness because the key has not yet been sent and without such key Bob cannot
access the message. After this initial commitment exchange, the following
steps involve the TTP to distribute the key and the evidences. The sending
of the key in step 3 by Alice to the TTP still does not give any advantage
to the principals. The step 4 and 4’ are the most important steps of the
protocol; here Alice receive, from the TTP, the receipt stating the correct
sending of the key and the commitment and Bob receive, from the TTP, the
key and the receipt stating the correct receipt of the commitment and the
key.
Timed Features in the Zhou-Gollmann efficient Non Repudiation
Protocol
To model correctly the ZGNRP protocol we need to:
• model the duration of the protocol. As already said the protocol have
a finite predetermined duration to end while trying to keep its fairness;
• model the transmission channels.
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The last point is of particular relevance in fact the communication chan-
nels, and ultimately the subsumed intruder model, can delay, lose or other-
wise not correctly deliver the messages between the principals and the TTP
causing situations where a principals does not know whether a protocol run is
finished or not and, consequently, causing a violation of the fairness property.
We will show in a following chapter that the protocol if fair as long as the
communication channels between the principals and the TTP are safe (i.e.:
the delivery of the messages is guaranteed).
4.1.4 A Timed Specification Language
The non-repudiation Zhou-Gollmann protocol, the TESLA authentication
protocol and the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol are all examples of protocols
that cannot be correctly modelled without accounting for time. The formal
framework generally employed to reason about time, in the context of finite
state machines, is that of Timed Automata, supported by the framework of
the temporal logics for the specification of its requirements.
However, the formalism of Timed Automata cannot be employed by pro-
tocol designer as a specification formalism in itself, being a too low level
formalism, unsuited to express high-level specifications of security protocols.
For this reason, in this thesis we propose a temporal extension of the, state of
the art, specification language HLPSL called Timed HLPSL (THLPSL).
In particular, the proposed extension of HLPSL introduces four kinds
of temporal features: (a) temporal constraints of the control flow (the usual
delays and timeouts associated with performing a transition) with respect
to the occurrence of some event, (b) duration of a transition, (c) temporal
constraints on the availability and usability of messages (message disclosure
and expiration time) with respect to the occurrence of some event, and (d)
delay in channel delivery.
THLPSL Syntax
The proposed extension THLPSL allows for expressing the following tem-
poral aspects:
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a) temporal constraints on the control flow of participants to a protocol
session;
b) duration of a transition, expressed as lower and upper bounds on its
duration;
c) temporal constraints on the availability and usability of messages (mes-
sage disclosure and expiration time);
d) duration of channel delivery, expressed as lower and upper bounds on
the channel delay.
Constraints on delay/timeout and message disclosure/expiration are expressed
with respect to the occurrence of a transition executed by a participant in
the protocol.
To allow for this extension, we introduce a new variable type role_instance
for role instances, which can only be used for formal parameters of roles (and
not for the declaration of local variables). Intuitively, a formal parameter RI
of type role_instance will be instantiated with a number between 1 and
n in the definition of the main composition role, where exactly n roles are
composed in parallel. Therefore, if RI is instantiated with number i, then it
refers to the i-th role instance in the parallel composition. This new feature
will allow for expressing time constraints relative to occurrences of events
(referred to by transition labels) taking place within specific role instances.
We also replace the original HLPSL constructs for channel declaration and
transition schemas with two new constructs and extend the set of terms as
follows:
Timed channels: the channel variable declaration has two additional pa-
rameters. The new operator takes the form C:channel(dy,lb,up), speci-
fying a Dolev-Yao channel with minimum transmission delay lb (a rational
number in Q≥0) and maximum transmission delay up (a rational number in
Q≥0 ∪ {∞});
Timed transitions: a new transition operator, replacing the original one,
takes six parameters, and has the form >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,label), where
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RI is a formal parameters of the current role of type role_instance, t1 and
lb are rational numbers in Q≥0, t2 and ub rational numbers in Q≥0 ∪ {∞},
and label is a transition label. It specifies a transition that will be enabled
between time t1 and t2 relative to the execution of the transition labelled
label within the role of role instance RI, that will complete between time
lb and ub. Similarly a new transition operator, takes four parameters, and
has the form ->(lb,ub,RI,label), where RI is a formal parameters of the
current role of type, lb is a rational number in Q≥0, t2 and ub rational
number in Q≥0 ∪{∞}, and label is a transition label. It specifies an urgent
transition, a transition that will fire as soon as enabled, time is not allowed
to pass in the starting state and that will complete between time lb and ub
relative to the execution of the transition labelled label within the role of
role instance RI;
Timed messages: the class of terms is extended to express timed mes-
sages by adding terms of the form X[dt,et,RI,label], where RI is a formal
parameter of type role_instance, X a variable of type text, text (fresh),
key or the result of a hashing operator, dt is a rational number in Q≥0 and ut
a rational number in Q≥0∪{∞} and label is a transition label. It intuitively
represents a term X that will be disclosed between time dt and et relative to
the execution of the transition labelled label within role instance RI, and it
will expire after the temporal bound et. Moreover, we add two predicates
of the form EXP(X), DISC(X), with X a variable of type text, text (fresh)
or key, which intuitively holds true if X is assigned to a message which has,
respectively, expired, disclosed. We also assume to have an additional label
start which represents a fictitious transition taken at time 0 to initialize the
main role. Notice that the new construct for transition schema still allows
for expressing untimed transitions. In particular, a transition without any
temporal constraints (neither delay/time out nor duration constraints) will
now take the form >>(0,∞,0,∞,RI,start), a transition having delay/time
out but no duration constraints takes the form >>(t1,t2,0,∞,RI,label),
while a transition having no delay/time out constraints but duration con-
straints takes the form >>(0,∞,lb,ul,RI,start).
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THLPSL Semantics
In an attempt to link back to previous consolidated results and theories we
provide the semantic of HLPSL in terms of its translation into Extended
Timed Automata. The translation into XTA ensures that our extension en-
joys a well-defined semantics and allows the use of some automated testing
tools (e.g.: the UPPAAL model checker) that make the formalism of au-
tomata timed their means of specification. For the sake of simplicity, we
will assume that in a THLPSL specification (a) no structured datatypes
are used, (b) transitions are uniquely labelled and (c) each transition con-
tains at most one send or one receive operation (d) there is only one main
composition role instantiating in parallel all the transition roles.
The intuition underlying the translation of Timed HLPSL into XTA is
the following:
- there is an automaton for each role instance, modelling the behaviour
of the role instance within the protocol;
- there is an intruder automaton, modelled as a Dolev-Yao intruder;
- there is no direct synchronisation between role instances. Message ex-
change is modelled by synchronising the sender with the intruder via
a channel, and then synchronising the intruder with the receiver via
another channel.
The network of automata is therefore composed of n+1 automata, where
n is the number of role instances. The automaton for i-th role instance is
denoted by RIi, while the automaton for the intruder will be denoted by IA.
Let X be a set of variables (including names for formal parameters),
partitioned according to the builtin THLPSL types. Therefore, we have
agent variables XA, text variables XT , key variables XK , channel variables
XC , role instance variables XRI , and nonces variables XNC . Let SMX be
the set of THLPSL terms built from X , as defined in the previous sections.
Given a term T , V AR(T ) denotes the set of the variables occurring in T ,
while V AR′(T ) the set of the variables occurring primed in T . Moreover, for
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a term T ∈ SMX , T denotes the term obtained by replacing every occurrence
of a primed variable X ′ with the variable X. For a term T ∈ SMX , T˜ denote
the term obtained by removing temporization from every occurrence of a
timed message occurring in T , eg.: substituting m for m[dt, et, RI, label] or
m†.
We also define a collection of concrete, pairwise disjoint, domains, one for
each THLPSL variable type: a set of agents A, text messages M, natural
numbers N , symmetric and public keys K, hash functions H, channels C,
and nonces NC . Let Σ be the union of those sets. Moreover, we add two a
distinguished (w.r.t. Σ ) sets, the set of role instances RI and labels L.
Given the collection of concrete domains, we can define the set SMΣ of
ground messages as the set obtained from THLPSL terms by (a) instantiating
any variable occurring in a term by a concrete element in Σ, chosen in a type
preserving way, and (b) adding a ground message of the form m†, for each
m ∈M∪K ∪NC , representing expired timed messages.
Let ρ : X → SMΣ be a partial valuation function associating variables to
ground messages. Valuation functions are associated with role instances. In-
tuitively, a valuation function encodes the current set of ground messages the
corresponding role instance has currently received or generated. Henceforth,
we assume that, for each formal parameter X of the role instance, ρ(X) is
set to the actual parameter associated with X in the main composition role.
Given a term T without primed variables and a valuation ρ defined on all
the variables in V AR(T ), T [ρ] denotes the ground message obtained from T
by substituting every occurrence of a variable X ∈ V AR(T ) with ρ(X).
Recall that, for communication between HLPSL roles to successfully take
place, it is required that the structure of the sent message m matches the
structure of the term T specified in the receive action within a THLPSL
transition. In particular, any unprimed variableX in term T requires that the
value ρ(X) is communicated in the matching part of m, while for any primed
variable X ′ any ground message of the same type of X can be communicated.
To capture this intuition, given a valuation function ρ : X → SMΣ, we define
a matching relation ⇒ρ⊆ SMX × SMΣ × 2X×SMΣ which associates a term
T and a ground message m with a partial valuation function ρu, binding
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variables to ground messages, as follows:
• (X ′,m)⇒ρ {(X,m)}, with X ∈ X ;
• (X,m)⇒ρ Ø if ρ(X) = m, with X ∈ X ;
• ({T}Z , {m}k)⇒ρ ρu if ρ(Z) = k and (T,m)⇒ρ ρu;
• (T1.T2,m1.m1)⇒ρ ρ1∪ρ2 if (T1,m1)⇒ρ ρ1, (T2,m2)⇒ρ ρ2 and ρ1∪ρ2
is a partial function.
Notice that, in order to successfully match an encrypted term with an
encrypted ground message (corresponding to decryption), the encryption key
must be known (ρ(Z) = k in the third clause above). Moreover, the matching
operation cannot detach the timing attributes (possibly associated with a
ground message) from a timed ground message.
To model generation of fresh nonces, we introduce a nonce generation
function as an injective function NC : RI × N → NC , mapping a role
instance and a natural number onto an element of NC . Given a role in-
stance r and a nonce generation function NC, we define the nonce assign-
ment function AF rNC : 2
X ×N → 2X×NC such that AF rNC ({X1, ..., Xk}, i) =
{(X1, nci+j1), ..., (Xk, nci+jk)} and for all 1 ≤ s ≤ k, the following must hold:
(a) 1 ≤ js ≤ k, (b) nci+js = NC(r, i+ js), and (c) js 6= jt if s 6= t.
Given a set of ground messages M , a role instance r and a label l occurring
in the role of r, let TM(M, r.l) = {m[k, z, r, l] : m[k, z, r, l] occurs in some
element of M and k > 0} and TM0(M, r.l) = {m[0, z, r, l] : m[0, z, r, l] occurs
some element of M}, which denote, respectively, the set of undisclosed and
disclosed timed messages occurring in M referring to label l in role instance
r. We also define:
Dis(M, r.l) = min
m[k,z,r,l]∈MT (M,r.l)
{k} Exp(M, r.l) = min
m[0,z,r,l]∈MT0(M,r.l)
{z}
denoting, respectively, the minimum disclosure and expiration times of the
timed messages in M referring to label l in role instance r. Given a valuation
function ρ, let Mρ = {m : ρ(x) = m for some x ∈ X} be the set of ground
messages in ρ.
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Let us consider the XTA channels needed in the translation. Recalling
that message exchange between role instances is modeled by synchronization
with the intruder via a pair of channels, one for message sending and one
for message delivery, and that channels in XTA do not convey values, for
each THLPSL channel c ∈ C and ground message m, we add a XTA channel
cs(m), denoting the sending channel for m, and the XTA channel cr(m),
denoting the receive channel for m. Role instances are only allowed to execute
output actions on sending channels and input actions on receive channels.
Conversely, the intruder can perform input actions on sending channels and
output actions on receive channels. Let Ξg be the set of sending/receive
channels.
As far as clocks are concerned, for each role instance r and transition
label l in the role of r, we have a clock CK(r.l). Let CKg be the set of clocks
for the pairs 〈r, l〉, plus an additional clock CK(start) used to refer to the
label start in any role.
Given a main composition role of the form:
R1(actual_parameter) /\ ... /\ Rn(actual_parameter)
where n roles are composed in parallel, we define a XTA 〈RI1 ‖ . . . ‖ RIn ‖
IA,Ξg, CKg〉 as follows.
Modeling role instances. The Timed Automaton RIi for role instance
ri, is the tuple RIi = 〈Li, Li0, Cki, Ii, δi〉, where Li is the set of tuples either
of the form 〈ρ, i〉 or 〈l, ρ, i〉, where ρ is a partial valuation function of the
role instance, i is a natural number corresponding to the last index used for
nonce generation by the role instance, and l is a label in L; Li0 is the set of
initial locations of the form 〈ρ, 0〉, where ρ satisfies (with the usual meaning)
the init predicate of the role. The set Cki of local clocks contains a clock d,
used to model the duration of transitions (as specified by the values lb and
up in THLPSL transitions).
The intuition underlying the translation of the temporal features of THLPSL
into XTA is the following:
• delay/timeout for a transition of the form >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,role_inst,l)
83
is modeled by guarding the XTA transitions with the clock constraint
t1 ≤ CK(r.l) ≤ t2, where r is the actual value of role_inst (notice
that CK(r.l) is reset whenever the transition labeled l is performed by
role instance r, conforming to the timed automata model we assume
that CK(r.l) is resetted at the start if the transition labeled l of the
role instance r is still to be taken);
• duration of transitions of the form >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,role_inst,l) is
modeled by splitting the transition into a sequence of two XTA tran-
sitions, the first one used to reset the clock d measuring the required
duration time, and the second transition guarded by the clock con-
straint lb ≤ d ≤ ub. Notice that, states of the form 〈l, ρ, i〉 corresponds
to the intermediate states in the two step sequence above. To force the
completion of the transition within the required bound ub, an invariant
of the form d ≤ ub is associated to the intermediate state;
• urgency of transitions in the form ->(lb,ub,role_inst,l) is modeled
using invariant on the starting state;
• disclosure and expiration of a timed message of the form m[dt,et,r,l]
is modeled by transitions guarded with the clock constraint CK(r.l) =
dt and CK(r.l) = et, respectively. Transitions disclosing the message
simply substitute each occurrence of m[dt, et, r, l] in the valuation ρ
with m[0, et, r, l] (representing the disclosed message), while transitions
for message expiration substitute every occurrence of m[0, et, r, l] with
the expired message m†.Clearly, in order to allow correct disclosure
(resp., expiration) with respect to the flow of time, we need to associate
invariants to each XTA state. The Timed Messages Invariant for states
〈ρ, i〉 and 〈l, ρ, i〉, in symbols TMI(Mρ), is the following:∧
r.l:MT (Mρ,r.l)6=∅
CK(r.l) < Dis(Mρ, r.l) ∧
∧
r.l:MT0(Mρ,r.l) 6=∅
CK(r.l) < Exp(Mρ, r.l)
Intuitively, the invariant requires that the first disclosure (resp., expi-
ration) to be executed is the one corresponding to the least disclosure
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time Dis(Mρ, r.l) and expiration time Exp(Mρ, r.l) ranging over the
sets of role instances and labels referenced in the timed messages in
Mρ;
• channels delays are modeled within the intruder automaton.
The relation δi and the invariant map Ii are then defined as follows:
State Transition or each transition lt. ps >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,l) ps’,
we add the following XTA transitions:
〈ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Clk−→ 〈lt, ρ′, j〉 where:
• ρ |= ps,
• ρ′ |= ps′;
• Clk = {d, CK(r.lt)} with r = ρ(RI) and ∆ is t1 ≤ CK(r.l) ≤ t2
with r = ρ(RI);
Message Sending for each transition lt. ps >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,l) C(T) /\ ps’,
we add the following XTA transitions:
〈ρ, i〉 cs(m)!,∆,Clk−→ 〈lt, ρ′, j〉 where:
• ρ |= ps and ρ(C) = c for the channel variable C,
• ρ′ |= ps′, with ρ′(X) = ρ(X), if X ∈ V AR(T ), and ρ′(X) = ρs(X),
if X ∈ V AR′(T ), and ρs = AF rNC (V AR′(T ), i);
• m = T [ρ′] and j = i+ |V AR′(T )|;
• Clk = {d, CK(r.lt)} with r = ρ(RI) and ∆ is t1 ≤ CK(r.l) ≤ t2
with r = ρ(RI);
Message Receive for each transition lt. ps /\ C(T) >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,l) ps’,
we add the following XTA transitions:
〈ρ, i〉 cr(m)?,∆,Clk−→ 〈lt, ρ′, i〉 where:
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• ρ |= ps and (T,m)⇒ρ ρu;
• ρ′ |= ps′, with ρ′(X) = ρ(X), if X ∈ V AR(T ), and ρ′(X) =
ρu(X), if X ∈ V AR′(T );
• Clk = {d, CK(r.lt)} with r = ρ(RI) and ∆ is t1 ≤ CK(r.l) ≤ t2
with r = ρ(RI);
Transition Duration for each state of the form 〈lt, ρ, i〉, for some label lt,
we add the following transitions:
〈lt, ρ, i〉 τ,∆,∅−→ 〈ρ, i〉
where ∆ is lb ≤ d ≤ ub;
Urgent Transition for each transition lt. ps ->(lb,ub,RI,l) ps’, we
add the following XTA transitions:
〈ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Clk−→ 〈ρ′, i〉 where:
• ρ |= ps;
• ρ′ |= ps′;
• Clk = {d, CK(r.lt)} with r = ρ(RI) and ∆ is CK(r.l) ≥ lb with
r = ρ(RI);
Message Disclosure for any pair 〈r, l〉 we add the following transitions:
〈lt, ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈lt, ρ′, i〉 and 〈ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈ρ′, i〉 where:
• ∆ is CK(r.l) = k, with k = Dis(Mρ, r.l);
• ρ′(X) = ρ(X)[m[k, z, r, l]/m[0, z, r.l]] for any X ∈ X , for some m;
Message Expiration for any pair 〈r, l〉 we add the following transitions:
〈lt, ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈lt, ρ′, i〉 and 〈ρ, i〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈ρ′, i〉 where:
• ∆ is CK(r.l) = z, with z = Exp(Mρ, r.l)
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• ρ′(X) = ρ(X)[m[0, z, r, l]/m†] for any X ∈ X , for some m;
Invariants to each state of the form 〈ρ, i〉 not created by an urgent tran-
sition we associate the invariant TMI(Mρ) to enforce message disclo-
sure/expiration, we associate (CK(r.l) < ub) ∧ TMI(Mρ) with r =
ρ(RI) otherwise; while to any state of the form 〈lt, ρ, i〉, such that ub
is the upper bound on the duration of the transition labeled lt, we
associate the following invariant (d ≤ ub) ∧ TMI(Mρ), for message
disclosure/expiration and transition completion.
Modeling the intruder. By observing the traffic over the network, a
Dolev-Yao intruder extends its knowledge, and, from its knowledge, can com-
pose and send fraudulent messages to honest participants. To model this
ability, we define the derivation relation `, which determines the messages
that the intruder is able to construct/deconstruct from a set M of (known)
messages. `⊆ 2SMΣ×SMΣ is the smallest relation closed under the following
rules:
• M ` m if m ∈M ;
• M ` m1.m2 if M ` m1 and M ` m2;
• M ` {m}k if M ` k, k ∈ K and M ` m;
• M ` m1 and M ` m2 if M ` m1.m2;
• M ` m if M ` k, k ∈ K and M ` {m}k;
• M ` h(m) if h ∈ H and M ` m;
In addition, for each c ∈ C such that c occurs as an actual parameter of type
channel(dy,lb,ub), inf(c) denotes lb and sup(c) denotes ub, an CK(c) is a
new clock which is used to model channel delay. We denote the set of clocks
associated to channels with CkIA .
Recall that massage exchange between honest participant is modeled by
a pair of synchronizations, one from the sender to the intruder and one from
the intruder to a receiver. Since a Dolev-Yao intruder is allowed to block
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messages, in our model the second synchronization is not guaranteed to take
place. Therefore, the delay of a communication can be interpreted as the
delay that the intruder introduces to complete the second synchronization.
In addition the intruder is allowed to generate and autonomously send mes-
sages along channels not involved in a communication among participants.
Therefore, we require fulfillment of delay constraints on channels only for the
first type of communication, called Message Delivery. For the second type
of communication (Autonomous Sending) no delay constraint is imposed. In
order to model delay constraints on Message Delivery, the intruder stores
the set of channels (channels queue) on which the first synchronization (from
the sender to the intruder) has occured without the second synchronization
having been completed. The channel queue does not store the messages
sent along the channels, since the intruder is allowed to alter the content of
communicated messages.
The intruder automaton IA is the tuple 〈L,L0, CkIA, I, δ〉, where L ⊆
2SMΣ × 2C is the set of intruder location. Each location is a pair 〈M,Q〉,
where M is a set of known messages and Q a channel queue. L0 ⊆ L are the
intruder initial locations (the intruder initial knowledge, as specified by the
knowledge predicate, with the empty channel queue), CkIA the set of clocks
for channels, I the invariant map, and δ the transition relation. The relation
δ and the map I are defined as follows:
Message Receive for each location 〈M,Q〉 ∈ L, ground message m ∈
SMΣ, and channel c ∈ C the following transition is added:
〈M,Q〉 cs(m)?,>,{CK(c)}−→ 〈M ∪ {m}, Q ∪ {c}〉
Message Delivery for each location 〈M,Q〉 ∈ L, ground message m ∈
SMΣ such that M ` m, and channel c ∈ Q the following transition is
added:
〈M,Q〉 cr(m)!,∆,Ø−→ 〈M,Q \ {c}〉
where ∆ is inf(c) ≤ CK(c) ≤ sup(c));
Autonomous Sending for each location 〈M,Q〉 ∈ L, ground message m ∈
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SMΣ such that M ` m, and channel c ∈ C \Q the following transition
is added:
〈M,Q〉 cr(m)!,>,Ø−→ 〈M,Q〉
Message Disclosure for each pair (r, l) such that TM(M, r.l) 6= ∅ the fol-
lowing transitions are added:
〈M,Q〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈M ′, Q〉 where:
• ∆ is CK(r.l) = k, with k = Dis(M, r.l);
• M ′ = M [m[k, z, r, l]/m[0, z, r, l]], for some m.
Message Expiration for each pair (r, l) such that TM0(M, r.l) 6= ∅ the
following transitions are added:
〈M,Q〉 τ,∆,Ø−→ 〈M ′, Q〉 where:
• ∆ is CK(r.l) = z, with z = Exp(M, r.l);
• M ′ = M [m[0, z, r, l]/m†], for some m.
Invariant the Timed Message Invariant TMI(M) is associated to each lo-
cation 〈M,Q〉 ∈ L.
Notice that protocol specifications written in THLPSL are not guaranteed
to lead to XTA having a finite number of locations. On the other hand, it is
possible to define simple syntactic restrictions on the specification (e.g., re-
strictions on the presence of loops, finiteness of the concrete domains, bounds
on the size of the set of messges the intruder can generate, etc.) which guar-
antee finiteness of the sets of locations of the translation. These restrictions
still allow for specifying and verifying interesting classes of protocols.
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Chapter 5
Timed Security Protocols
Model Checking Framework
In this chapter we focus on the implementation of a model checking frame-
work for the analysis of security protocols which employs the presented
THLPSL language as a specification language. In section 5.1 we will in-
troduce the Timed Protocol Model Checker (TPMC) framework and provide
detail on its implementation. To illustrate how our framework applies, in
section 5.2 we will also provide the specification in THLPSL of the pro-
tocols presented in section 4.1. We will end in section 5.3 showing how
the framework perform and, where possible, how its performance compare
against state of the art protocols verifiers.
5.1 TPMC: Timed Security Protocols Model
Checking Framework
The TPMC (Timed Protocols Model Checker) tool we developed for the anal-
ysis of timed security protocols employs THLPSL as a specification language
and UPPAAL as the model checking engine. The analysis of a protocol in
TPMC consists in a translation of its THLPSL specification into the input
language of UPPAAL according to the semantics presented in 4.1.4. For the
sake of ease of definition, such a semantics maps THLPSL specification onto
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pure XTAs, without exploiting the full expressive power of the UPPAAL
language, which allows for shared integers variables, and integer and boolean
arrays. The use of this additional features allows for exponentially more suc-
cinct UPPAAL specifications. As a consequence, the mapping implemented
in TPMC is not the one described in the formal semantics, but a semantically
equivalent one which, taking advantage of the full expressiveness of UPPAAL
XTAs, can be more efficiently employed for implementation purposes.
5.1.1 From THLPSL specifications to UPPAAL XTAs
In this section we shall show how to encode a THLPSL specification into a
XTA suitable for model checking in UPPAAL. As we have seen in Chapter
2, UPPAAL XTA are an extension of Timed Automata, where a parallel
composition, in the style of CCS, of a collection of Timed Automata com-
municate by means of channels and the communication style is handshaking.
Input symbols in a XTA are replaced by channel names. If a is the name of
a communication channel, then the symbol a? denotes the receiving action
over channel a, while the symbol a! denotes the sending action over chan-
nel a. Moreover, XTA can use (boolean and integer) variables and arrays.
Therefore, the guard of a XTA transition may also constraints values of vari-
ables and array elements besides clocks and the updates are also generalised
allowing also assignments involving variables and arrays. Refer to Chapter 2
for a more detailed insight.
As previously said, the formal semantics of THLPSL has be given in
Section 4.1.4 by translation into a network of timed automata. In such a
translation a timed automaton is provided for each instance role and a timed
automaton is provided for the intruder.
States of both the participants and the intruder are structured and, in
particular, encode besides control information also the knowledge of the play-
ing part at the represented stage of the interaction. Knowledge is suitably
encoded by sets of ground instances of message term (ground messages).
The intruder’s knowledge is a monotonically increasing set of structured
messages. A DY intruder can send to role instances any structured message
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that it can derive from its knowledge. For every received message the in-
truder can extract any possible sub message, compatibly with its knowledge
of the necessary cryptographic keys. Conversely, known sub messages can be
recombined freely, using the algebra of message operators. Since structured
message provide an unbounded use of pairing cryptographic encoding oper-
ators, the number of message the intruder can possibly build is unbounded.
However, the messages composed by the intruder which are relevant for the
protocol are those unifiable with the message patterns expected by the role
instances. Even considering a bounded set of messages, the fact that the
intruder can compose and/or modify communicated messages results in an
explosion in the number of states (which depend on the subset construction
of the set of received messages) and in the number of transitions.
Therefore, the translation defined in Section 4.1.4 in order to give the
semantics of the THLPSL, cannot be immediately exploited for implemen-
tation purposes, and a more succinct encoding of THLPSL is required.
For a succinct encoding, the translation implemented in TPMC exploits
the ability of UPPAAL of handling XTA specifications enriched with vari-
ables and arrays. Arrays and variables are used both to encode the knowledge
of the role instances and of the intruder, as well as the intruder’s ability to
compose and decompose messages. The net result of this encoding, is that
most of the burden of managing the explosion of the space of states is left to
the model checker.
In particular, the intruder’s knowledge is encoded by a boolean array
K, where each location represents either a structured message sent along a
channel, or a (sub)message obtained by composition/decomposition of known
messages. A location of the array K is set to true when the intruder knows the
corresponding (sub)message. Similarly, each role instance ri is encoded by
an array of integers Nri, which contains the current ground instance associated
to each variable occurring in a send or receive operation of the corresponding
role.
Communication between role instances is not direct, but implemented by
a pair of synchronisations, one between the sender and the intruder and one
between the intruder and the receiver. Since communication in the formalism
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of XTA takes the form of pure communication, a different channel is provided
for each conveyed message. Therefore, for each pair < M,CHN >, with m
a structured ground message sent (resp., received) by a role instance and
CHN a channel name (intuitively, the channel where the message has been
sent), a XTA synchronisation channel named C_CHN_s_m (resp.,C_CHN_r_m)
is created.
Since delay/timeouts of timed transition and disclosure/expiration of
timed messages are specified relative to a transition label, in order to model
these timed feature a clock named CK_lab_ri is associated to every pair
〈lab,ri〉, such that transition label lab and role instance ri occur among
the parameters of some timed transition or timed message term. Moreover, a
boolean array F is used to record, for each transition label referenced within
a timed message term or timed transition, whether it has been already ex-
ecuted. An additional clock named CK_start is used to model timed con-
straints referencing the special label start, corresponding to the initialisation
time of the main role. To model the duration of transitions taken by role
instances, a local clock named dri is associated to role instance ri. To model
channels delays, to every channel CHN , for which a delay constraint is speci-
fied, a clock CK_CHN is added. Finally, in order to model disclosure/expiration
of timed messages, two boolean arrays D and E are used, which record whether
a timed message has been disclosed or has expired, respectively.
The translation of a THLPSL specification generates:
- an automaton for each role instance;
- an automaton for the intruder;
- an automaton (the Time Machine) responsible for handling disclosure
and expiration of timed messages.
As to the generation of the automata for the role instances, the first step
consists in collecting, by means of a fixpoint construction, the set GM of
ground messages and the set TM ⊆ GM of timed messages possibly gen-
erated by the protocol participants and the intruder, according to a typed
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model. This phase defines, for each role instance ri, the following correspon-
dences, recorded in suitable data structures:
i. a function ρri : MV arri −→ 2GM mapping each message variable of the
role of ri onto a set of possible instances of that variable;
ii. for every message term M occurring in a receive operation in the role of
ri, a function
χMri : V ar
′
ri(M) −→ 2GM , mapping the primed variable occurring in M
(V ar′ri(M)) onto sets of possible instances of ground messages.
The function ρri encodes a set of possible evaluations for the message vari-
ables of the role instance, in the sense that for a message variable X, ρri(X)
gives the set of possible values of the vector element Nri[X], up to a suitable
encoding of ground messages into integers. Function χMri encodes the re-
sult of a structure preserving unification mechanism between message terms
expected by the receiver and ground terms sent by a sender.
In the following we sketch the construction of the instance role automaton
for ri. For the sake of presentation, some of the technical details are omitted.
Each location of a role instance automaton represents a location in which
some state predicate holds. Let L be the set of atoms of the form X = c,
such that X = c occurs in a transition SPred or of the form X ′ = c, such
that X ′ = c occurs in a transition Primed_Pred. The set of locations of the
role instance automaton for ri are in correspondence with subsets of L.
The general form of a sending timed transition is:
lab. SPred /\ MPred >>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,lab1)
Primed_Pred /\ CHM(M)
Each THLPSL transition defines a set of pairs of XTA transitions, a pair
for each possible instantiation (given by the functions ρri and χ
M
ri ) of the mes-
sage variables {X1, ..., Xk} occurring in the transition, as shown in Fig. 5.1.
The first XTA transition models the effect of the THLPSL transition, while
the second one models its duration. With reference to Fig. 5.1, given θ =
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〈φ, a, λ〉 〈lb ≤ CK d ri ≤ ub, , 〉
Figure 5.1: XTA transitions encoding a timed transition.
{m1, ...,mk} a possible instantiation of the message variable {X1, ..., Xk} ac-
cording to ρri:
• l is a location corresponding to a set of atoms in L which contains all
the atoms in SPred.
• l′ is a location corresponding to a set of atoms in L which contains all
the atoms of the form X = c, such that X ′ = c occurs in Primed_Pred,
and all the atoms X = c occurring in SPred such that X ′ does not
occurs in Primed_Pred.
• l′′ is a distinct copy of l′, introduced to model transition duration.
• φ is a conjunction of: (i) atoms of the form Nri[Xi] = mi for every
message variable Xi occurring unprimed in the message term M ; (ii)
atoms of the form Nri[Xi] = Nri[Xj] (resp., not Nri[Xi] = Nri[Xj]),
for every atom of the form Xi = Xj (resp., not Xi = Xj) occurring in
MPred, and atoms of the form E[Xi] = 1 (resp., E[Xi] = 0), for every
atom of the form EXP (Xi) (resp., not EXP (Xi)) occurring in MPred;
and (iii) the clock condition t1 ≤ CK_lab1_ri ≤ t2.
• a is C_CHM_s_m!, where m is the ground message obtained by substi-
tuting {X1, ..., Xk} by θ.
• λ is a set of assignments contag F[lab_ri] := 1, CK_d_ri := 0,
CK_lab_ri := 0, Nri[Xi] := mi for each Xi occurring primed in M .
Notice that the transition guard φ enables the transition when the current
state: (i) assigns to the unprimed variables the ground messages assigned
by θ; and (ii) satisfies all the conjuncts in MPred. The update λ sets the
flag F[lab_ri] to record the execution of the transition, resets the clocks
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associated to the transition, and assigns fresh values to the primed variables
in the message term sent. The general form of a receive timed transition is:
lab. SPred /\ MPred /\ CHM(M)
>>(t1,t2,lb,ub,RI,lab1) Primed_Pred
Each receive THLPSL transitions defines a set of XTA transitions, one for
each possible instantiation (given by the functions ρri and χ
M
ri ) of the message
variables {X1, ..., Xk} occurring in the transition. Given θ = {m1, ...,mk} a
possible instantiation of the message variable {X1, ..., Xk} according to ρri,
and ψ = {u1, ..., uz} a possible matching, according to χMri , for the message
variable {Y1, ..., Yz} occurring primed in M , a pair of XTA transitions as in
Fig. 5.1 is added, where:
• l, l′, l′′ and φ are defined as for send transitions;
• a is C_CHM_r_m? where m is the ground term obtained by substituting
the message variables in
{X1, ..., Xk} which occur unprimed in M by θ and all the message
variables in {Y1, ..., Yz} by ψ;
• λ is a set of assignments containing F[lab_ri] := 1, CK_d_ri := 0,
CK_lab_ri := 0, Nri[Yi] := ui, for each Yi ∈ {Y1, ..., Yz}.
To guarantee that the duration of a timed (send or receive) transition is
modeled correctly, the intermediate location in Fig. 5.1 is equipped with the
invariant1 lb ≤ CK d ri ≤ ub.
Since urgent transitions cannot send or receive messages, neither syn-
chronization nor update is necessary. Therefore, they are encoded as XTA
transitions between a starting location l to an ending location l′ defined as in
the previous cases, with the addition that the starting location is set urgent,
and the guard condition is a conjunction of atoms of the same form as those
defined for cases (ii) and (iii) for timed send or receive transitions.
1Invariants are associated to locations; remaining in a location is allowed as long as the
invariant holds true.
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To model a DY intruder, the intruder automaton plays the role of the com-
munication channel between the role instances, and it is allowed to compose,
decompose, forward, block and delay messages. The automaton has a single
location and loop transitions for sending known messages to role instances,
receiving messages sent by role instances and composing/decomposing mes-
sages.
For every ground message m ∈ GM and channel CHN , there is a loop
transition for a send action, whose decoration 〈φ, a, λ〉 is
〈K[m] = 1 ∧ CK CHN ≥ lb , C CHN r m!, 〉,
where CK_CHN is the clock associated to channel CHN to model channel
delay.
For every a ground message m ∈ GM and channel CHN , there is a loop
transition for a receive action, whose decoration 〈φ, a, λ〉 is
〈 , C CHN s m?, K[m] := 1; CK CHN := 0〉
Transitions for composition/decomposition of messages encode the stan-
dard rules of a DY intruder. For instance, if the intruder knows two ground
messages m1 and m2 and m1.m2 ∈ GM , then it also knows m1.m2 (and
vice versa). Similarly, if it knows a ground messages {m1}k and a ground
key k, and m1 ∈ GM , then it also knows m1 (and vice versa). The loop
transitions for the above two composition, decomposition actions have the
following decorations: the former is 〈K[m1] ∧ K[m2], , K[m1.m2] := 1〉
(〈K[m1.m2], , K[m1] := 1;K[m2] := 1〉), and the latter is 〈K[{m1}k] ∧
K[k], , K[m1] := 1〉 (〈K[m1] ∧K[k], , K[{m1}k] := 1〉).
The Time Machine automaton (TM) is responsible for handling disclosure
and expiration of timed messages by updating the boolean arrays D and E.
The array F is used to record the execution of a transition referenced by some
timed message (or timed transition). Therefore, disclosure or expiration of a
timed message relative to a given transition is performed only if the referenced
transition of role instance ri labeled lab has been executed (F[lab ri]= 1).
For every ground message m which is an instance of a timed variable
message X[dt,et,RI,lab] in role instance ri, a loop transition for disclosure
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is added, whose decoration 〈φ, a, λ〉 is
〈F[lab ri]= 1 ∧ not D[m] ∧ CK lab ri = dt, , D[m] := 1〉
and a loop transition for expiration is added whose decoration 〈φ, a, λ〉 is
〈F[lab ri]=1 ∧ not E[m] ∧ CK lab ri = et, , E[m]:= 1〉
To guarantee disclosure/expiration transition at due time without any
further delay, the location of TM is equipped with an appropriate invariant.
The invariant is a conjunction, over all the ground instances m of the timed
message terms of the form X[dt,et,RI,lab] within role instance ri, of
constraints of the form:
(F[lab_ri] ∧ not D[m])→ CK_lab_ri ≤ dt) ∧
(F[lab_ri] ∧ D[m] ∧ not E[m])→ CK_lab_ri ≤ et)
5.1.2 Framework Architecture and Limits
The general architecture of the verification environment is depicted in Figure
5.2. The system is composed of two modules, a verification engine, namely
the model checker UPPAAL [BY04], and a compiler which takes as input a
THLPSL specifications and translates it into the input language of UPPAAL.
The input language of UPPAAL is a textual representations of an XTA .
The tool takes a THLPSL specification and automatically generates a
network of XTAs, simulating the protocol and an appropriate CTL formula,
which encodes the desired security goal possibly included in the THLPSL
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specification. The compiler, then, first pre-computes this set of the ground
messages that can be generated during the protocol runs either by the le-
gal participants to the protocol or by the intruder. Once computed the set
of messages, the compiler generates: one automaton for each each role in-
stance, modeling the behavior of the role instance; an automaton modeling
the behavior of the intruder.
Notice that the full syntax of THLPSL, which allows for, e.g., integer
variables and transition systems containing infinite loops generating fresh
messages, can be used to specify system with an infinite number of loca-
tions. In addition, the language, similarly to HLPSL, does not restrict a
protocol specification to a finite number of sessions, therefore allowing an
infinite number of messages to be generated. These specification cannot be
translated into a XTA network, since XTAs are constrained to a finite num-
ber of locations. Since decision problems are not decidable for the resulting
protocol models (even in their untimed version), while the corresponding de-
cision problems for XTAs are decidable, the THLPSL language is strictly
more expressive than XTAs. To allow for automatic protocol analysis, our
translation assumes THLPSL specifications with finite number of sessions,
which do not allow for infinite generation of nonces within loops, and where
integer variables take value in a bounded domain (e.g., this is the case for
the variable used, in particular, to enforce a finite state control flow for each
automaton).
As far as verification is concerned, the environment allows both to specify
the CTL properties to be analyzed directly from the UPPAAL interface, and
to specify a set of predefined security properties in a higher lever language
within the goal section of a THLPSL specification. Currently, secrecy prop-
erties and (weak and strong) authentication properties are allowed within
the goal section. In the latter case, the translator is responsible of auto-
matically generating the corresponding CTL formula. Direct specification of
CTL properties clearly requires knowledge of the logical formalism employed,
therefore it is reserved to specialized users.
A secrecy property is a security property requiring that a given message
term is kept secret by the protocol. Since the number of ground messages in
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the protocol can be kept finite, this property can be encoded by a formula
which checks, for every reachable state, that every ground message possibly
instantiating the message term is never contained into the knowledge of the
intruder.
An authentication property in THLPSL is specified using the witness and
the request keywords. This kind of property cannot be directly encoded in
the fragment of CTL allowed by UPPAAL. To encode it in UPPAAL, we
use, for each ground message matching the message term involved in the
authentication, two additional boolean variable, one for the request and one
for the witness.
5.2 Timed Protocols Examples: Modelling in
THLPSL
In this section we will propose possible encoding in THLPSL for the timed
protocols presented in Section 4.1.
5.2.1 Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
The temporal feature we identified in Section 4.1 as needed to model correctly
the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol were:
• the use of the timestamp exchanged by the principals;
• the timing in both principals action and channels.
In order to model the validity of timestamps and session keys in THLPSL,
we associate to each of them an expiration time. In particular, the initiator
assigns an expiration time to the session key, wide enough to cover the esti-
mated maximum delays of both the communication channels from Alice to
the Server and from the Server to Bob. Similarly, Alice (resp., the Server) as-
signs the expiration time to each generated timestamp. An attack would be
detected if Bob receives an expired session key associated with a non expired
timestamp.
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Below is a possible specification of the protocol, where we assume a max-
imum delay 5 to the channels connecting the participants. The expiration of
the session key is set to the sum of the channels delays. The role for agent
Alice is specified as follows:
role Alice(A,B,S:agent, SND:channel(dy,0,5),
Kas:symmetric_key, AI:role_instance)
played_by A def= :
local Stat:nat, Ta:text(fresh), Kab:symmetric_key
init Stat=0
transition
a0. Stat=0 >>(0,∞,0,0,AI,start) Stat’=1 /\
SND(A.{Ta’[0,5,AI,a0].B.Kab[0,10,AI,a0]}_Kas)
end role
Notice that the role Alice is parametrised with respect to three agent
names (A, B,S), one dy channel SND, one symmetric key Kas, and one role
instance parameter AI. The played_by keyword states that the agent playing
the role corresponds to the first agent parameter A. In the local variable
declaration section the variable Stat, of type natural number, a fresh nonce
variable Ta and a symmetric key Kab are declared. The init clause opens the
variable initialisation section, while the transition clause opens the section
containing transition schemas. The transition schema, labelled a0, is a send
timed transition which takes from a state where variable Stat is equal to 0 to
a state where Stat is equal to 1, and all the remaining variables, except Ta,
remain unchanged. The additional effect of the transition is that the term
A.{Ta’[0,5,AI,a0].B.Kab[0,10,AI,a0]}_Kas is sent over the channel SND,
where Ta’[0,5,AI,a0] represents a fresh timestamp generated and assigned
to Ta by the transition, with disclosure/expiration interval between time 0
and 5 relative to the execution of the transition a0 of the current role instance
AI.
The role for agent Bob is specified as follows:
role Bob(A,B,S:agent, RCV:channel(dy,0,5),
Kbs:symmetric_key, BI:role_instance)
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played_by B def=
local Stat, Valid:nat, Ts:text, Kab:symmetric_key
init Stat=0
transition
b0. Stat=0 /\ RCV({Ts’.A.Kab’}_Kbs)
>>(0,∞,0,0,BI,start) Stat’=1
b1. Stat=1 /\ not EXP(Ts) /\ not EXP(Kab)
->(0,∞,BI,start)
Stat’=2 /\ Valid’=1
b2. Stat=1 /\ not EXP(Ts) /\ EXP(Kab)
->(0,∞,BI,start)
Stat’=2 /\ Valid’=0
end role
As to Bob’s role, the first transition is a receive transition which re-
quires that another party synchronously sends a message along the chan-
nel RVC, and that the sent message conforms to the structure of the term
{Ts’.A.Kab’}_Kbs. The primed variables Ts’ and Kab’ in the received term
are assigned, after the transition is executed, the value of the corresponding
subterm in the unifying received message. The last two transitions are urgent
transitions (always enabled) which test the validity of the timestamp and of
the key and accept (resp., reject) the key by assigning the value 1 (resp., 0)
to the boolean variable Valid.
The Server role is specified as follows:
role Server(A,B,S:agent, RCV,SND:channel(dy,0,5),
Kas,Kbs:symmetric_key, SI:role_instance)
played_by S def=
local Stat:nat, Ts:text(fresh),
Ta:text, Kab:symmetric_key
init Stat=0
transition
s00. Stat=0 /\ RCV(A.{Ta’.B.Kab’}_Kas)
>>(0,∞,0,0,SI,start) Stat’=1
s01. Stat=1 /\ not EXP(Ta) >>(0,∞,0,0,SI,start)
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Stat’=3 /\ SND({Ts’[0,5,SI,s02].A.Kab}_Kbs)
end role
Notice that both the Server and Bob check for non expiration of times-
tamps (not EXP(Ta) and not EXP(Ts)) before proceeding (resp., before ac-
cepting the session key). Moreover, the Server sets expiration of the times-
tamps it generates relative to the transition generating it. To model possible
acceptance by Bob of an invalid key, we use a variable Valid in Bob’s role,
which is set to 0 (transition b2) if the accepted key has already expired, and
to 1 (transition b1), otherwise.
The main role Main instantiates one instance of role Alice, one of the role
Bob and three of the role Server. Roles are instantiated by associating actual
parameters (i.e., constants) to formal ones. The resulting role instances are
composed in parallel.
role Main()
def=
composition
Alice(A,B,S,Snda,Kas,0) /\ Bob(A,B,S,Rcvb,Kbs,1)
/\ Server(A,B,S,Snda,,Rcvb,Kas,Kbs,2)
/\ Server(B,A,S,Sndb,Rcva,Kbs,Kas,3)
/\ Server(A,B,S,Snda,Rcvb,Kas,Kbs,4)
end role
A simple property requiring acceptance only for valid keys is the following
CTL formula
AG¬(Alice0.Stat = 1 ∧Bob1.Stat = 2 ∧ ¬Bob1.V alid),
which can be checked by the model checker UPPAAL. The property is false,
as it is possible for role instance bob to accept as valid a key after it has
expired.
5.2.2 TESLA Authentication Protocol
The modelling of the TESLA protocol in THLPSL is not straightforward
as the WMF protocols. In fact to model the TESLA protocol we need a way
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to model the splitting of the packet stream into intervals and the condition
in equation (4.1). While it is easy to model interval by assigning to each
THLPSL transition a temporal constraint in the form of the enabling con-
dition, the ability to account for the temporal displacement ∆ between the
sender and the receiver and the corresponding condition requires a suitable
encoding.
We can account for the parameter ∆ by combining temporal constraints
on transitions and timed messages. The idea is to associate temporal con-
straints to the payload (i.e., payloads are modeled by timed messages) where
the disclose/expiration time is shifted ahead, with respect the bounds of the
interval time in which it is sent, of the amount of time ∆.
In the following, we assume a value ∆ = 2 and a Tint = 9. The sender
sends the first message between time 10 and 19. The validity of this message
(i.e., the guarantee that the message has been sent by the sender) is between
the sending time and the corresponding key disclosure time. On the other
hand, due to the displacement ∆ = 2, the receiver must account for the
maximum time synchronization error. Therefore, the receiver must consider
the packet as valid, if received between time 10 and time 21. The complete
specification of the sender is the following:
role Sender(S,R:agent, RCV,SND:channel(dy, 0, inf), F,MAC:function,
KP:public_key, RI:role_instance) played_by S
def= local State : nat, NB : text,
M1,M2,M3 : text(fresh),
K1, K2, K3, K4: symmetric_key, KB : symmetric_key
init State = 0
transition
req. State = 0 /\ RCV(NB’) >>(0,1,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 1
setup. State = 1 >>(1,10,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 2 /\
SND(NB.F(K1)_(KP))
s1. State = 2 >>(10,19,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 3
/\ SND(M1’[10,21,start,RI].F(K2).KB.MAC(K1.M1’.F(K2).KB))
/\ witness(S,R,m1,M1)
s2. State = 3 >>(19,28,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 4
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/\ SND(M2’[19,30,start,RI].F(K3).K1.MAC(K2.M2’.F(K3).K1))
s3. State = 4 >>(28,37,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 5
/\ SND(M3’[28,39,start,RI].F(K4).K2.MAC(K3.M3’.F(K4).K2))
end role
Notice that the specification considers just four iterations of the proto-
col loop. This is essentially due to the decidability issues discussed at the
end of the previous section, and to the fact that in this thesis we are only
interested in checking the time dependent packet authentication mechanism
implemented in TESLA.
In the local variable declaration section, the variable State represents
the current state of the sender. The fresh text variables M1, M2 and M3 are
the payloads of the second, third and fourth message (the first message has
no payload). The keys K1, K2, K3 and K4 are the keys used to compute the
MACs of the messages, and variable NB represents the nonce received by the
receiver and is used to ensure freshness of the session. The key KB is the
bogus key disclosed in the message in the first step. The init clause opens
the variable initialization section, while the keyword transition opens the
section containing transition schemas. Note that non initialized non nonces
variables (i.e.: of type text(fresh)) likeK1 are considered implicitly initialized
to a unique value. The first transition labeled req is a receive transition that
models the receipt of the fresh nonces sent by the receiver. It takes from
a state where variable State= 0 to a state where State= 1, and all the
other variables remain unchanged. The additional effect of the transition is
that the content of the channel RCV is assigned to the variable called NB. The
transition schema, labeled setup, is a send transition. Besides performing
the state change from 1 to 2, it sends the message term {F(K)}_(KP) over
the channel SND. This is the first message of the sender used to setup the
protocol run. This message contains the commitment to the first key (K1)
encrypted with its public key (KP). The transition scheme labeled s1, s2,
s3 send the messages to be authenticated. Let us consider the transition s1
(the other are similar). The term M1’[10,21,start,RI] represents a fresh
message, with disclosure/expiration interval between time 10 and 21, relative
to the start of the protocol (label start). Timing messages is therefore used
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to bind each payload to the temporal interval where the corresponding key
has not yet been disclosed. Note also that each transition is timed. For
instance, the decoration >>(10,19,0,0,RI,start) of transition s1 means
that the the transition is enabled only between time 10 and 19 from the
start of the protocol run. This time constraints models the assumption that
the interval size Tint is of length 9. The use of timed messages to model
intervals is exploited in the receiver to model the TESLA security condition.
A parametric receiver is, then, defined as follows:
role Receiver(S,R:agent, RCV,SND:channel(dy, 0, inf), F,MAC:function,
KP:public_key, RI:role_instance) played_by R
def= local State : nat, NB : text(fresh),
M1, M2, M3 : text, MAC1, MAC2, MAC3 : text,
KB, K1, K2 : symmetric_key, FK1, FK2, FK3, FK4 : text
init State = 0
transition
req. State = 0 >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 1 /\ SND(NB’)
setup. State = 1 /\ RCV(NB.FK1’_(KP)) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 2
step1. State = 2 /\ RCV(M1’.FK2’.KB’.MAC1’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 3 /\ request(R,S,m1,M1)
verstep1. State = 3 /\ not EXP(M1) =|> State’ = 5
step2. State = 5 /\ RCV(M2’.FK3’.K1’.MAC2’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
Statea’ = 6
verstep2. State = 6 /\ not EXP(M2) /\ FK1=F(K1) /\ MAC1=MAC(K1.M1.FK2.KB) =|>
State’ = 7
step3. State = 7 /\ RCV(M3’.FK4’.K2’.MAC3’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 8
verstep3. State = 8 /\ not EXP(M3) =|> State’ = 9
verL. State = 9 /\ FK2=F(K2) =|> State’ = 10
verMAC2. State = 10 /\ MAC2=MAC(K2.M2.FK3.K1) =|> State’ = 11
end role
The transition req sends a fresh nonce to the sender in order to start
the protocol run. The transition setup is a receive transition, where a mes-
sage with a structure compatible with {NB.FK1’}_(KP) is received along the
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channel RCV. The ground value received for component NB must match the
ground message associated to variable NB in the previous transition (where it
was generated). The side effect is that the primed variable FK1’ is assigned
to the value of the corresponding term in the received message.
Since the sender and the receiver are not necessarily synchronized (due
to possible local time displacement and delays caused by the intruder) the
receiver must be allowed to receive messages in time intervals different from
the one scheduled by the sender. Therefore, transitions of the receiver are
not constrained to specific time bounds.
Transition verstep1 is responsible for checking the condition in equa-
tion (4.1) for the first message. The check is modeled by the predicate
not EXP(M1), which verifies whether the payload contained in the received
message is not yet expired (therefore, ensuring that it has been sent before
the corresponding key was disclosed). This transition is an instantaneous
transition, as the check must be performed as soon as the message is re-
ceived.
Transition step2 receives the second message, while verstep2 performs
both the checks of condition (4.1) for the newly received message and the
authentication of the previously received one. This second check corresponds
to conditions (2) (i.e., FK1=F(K1)) and (3) (i.e., MAC1=MAC(K1.M1.FK2.KB))
of the TESLA security condition. Analogously for the remaining transitions.
For the sake of exposition, below we show a specification of a simplified
version of the second schema of TESLA, where the receiver is able to recover
the loss of the second message only. The main differences with respect to
the first schema are in the structure of the messages sent and received and,
according to the description given in the previous section, in the way the
receiver authenticates the packets.
As to the sender specification, the only difference is that instead of using
the keys K1, K2, K3 and K4, it uses H(H(H(H(K)))), H(H(H(K))), H(H(K)),
and H(K), respectively.
role Sender(S,R:agent, RCV,SND:channel(dy, 0, inf), F,H,MAC:function,
KP:public_key, RI:role_instance) played_by S
def= local State : nat, NB : text,
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M1,M2,M3,M4 : text(fresh), K : symmetric_key, KB : symmetric_key
init State = 0
transition
req. State = 0 /\ RCV(NB’)>>( 0,1,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 1
setup. State = 1 >>( 1,10,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 2
/\ SND( NB.F(H(H(H(H(K)))))_(KP) )
s1. State = 2 >>(10,19,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 3
/\ SND( M1’[10,21,start,RI].KB.MAC(H(H(H(H(K)))).M1’.KB)
/\ witness(S,R,m1,M1)
s2. State = 3 >>(19,28,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 4 /\
SND( M2’[20,30,start,RI].H(H(H(H(K)))).
MAC(H(H(H(K))).M2’.H(H(H(H(K)))))
s3. State = 4 >>(28,37,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 5 /\
SND( M3’[30,39,start,RI].H(H(H(K))).MAC(H(H(K)).M3’.H(H(H(K))))
end role
As to the receiver, recall that in this version it also needs to check if
a packet is lost and, if this is the case, perform the corresponding recover
phase.
role Receiver(S,R:agent, RCV,SND:channel(dy, 0, inf), F,H,MAC:function,
KP:public_key, RI:role_instance ) played_by R
def= local State, HC : nat, NB : text(fresh),
M1, M2, M3 : text, MAC1, MAC2, MAC3 : text,
K : symmetric_key, KB, HK, HHK, HHHK, FHHHHKP : text
init State = 0 /\ HC = 0
transition
req. State = 0 >> (0,inf,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 1 /\ SND(NB’)
setup. State = 1 /\ RCV(NB.FHHHHK’_(KP)) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 2
step1. State = 2 /\ RCV(M1’.KB’.MAC1’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 3 /\ request(R,S,m1,M1)
verstep1. State = 3 /\ not EXP(M1) =|> State’ = 4
step2. State = 4 /\ RCV(M2’.HHHHK’.MAC2’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 5
lost2. State = 4 >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start) State’ = 5 /\ HC’ = 1
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verstep2. State = 5 /\ HC = 0/\ not EXP(M2)
/\ FHHHHK=F(HHHHK))
/\ MAC1=MAC(HHHHK.M1.KB)=|> State’ = 7
step3. State = 7 /\ RCV(M3’.HHHK’.MAC3’) >>(0,inf,0,0,RI,start)
State’ = 8
verstep3. State = 8 /\ not EXP(M3) =|> State’ = 9
verL. State = 10 /\ FHHHHK=F(H(HHHK)) =|>
State’ = 11
verMAC2. State = 11 /\ MAC2=MAC(HHHK.M2.HHHHK) =|>
State’ = 12
recovery2. State = 12 /\ HC = 1
/\ MAC1=MAC(H(HHHK).M1.KB) =|> State’ = 13
end
The check of the packet loss is modeled using two transition, step2 and
lost2, and additional flag HC which witnesses the possible loss of a packet.
Transition step2 is executed if the expected message is delivered in the cor-
rect interval. If no packet loss occurs, the receiver proceeds similarly to the
first schema. If, on the other hand, the enabling interval of step2 elapses
without a message receipt, lost2 is executed, setting the flag HC to 1. In this
case, the receiver has to delay the authentication of the first message after
the authentication of the third message (transition recovery2).
The witness and the request operators, occurring in the transitions
step1 of the receiver and s1 of the sender, respectively, in both version of
the specifications, are used to specify the authentication property. These
operator in the roles of the parties which must authenticate each other, and
are parameterized by the name of the parties involved in the authentication
process and the message term with respect to the authentication must occur
(e.g., a term corresponding to a password). Intuitively, the witness models
the challenge for the authentication, while the matching request models the
response to the challenge. In the first model, the transitions labeled s1 in
the Sender and step1 in the Receiver contain a pair of witness and request
terms which are used to specify the authentication property. Intuitively, this
witness and request pair requires that pairs of instances of roles S and R,
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instantiated with the same values for the parameters of agent type, must
agree on the value of the message term M1. In other words, whenever the
receiver R performs a request on a ground message instantiating M1, that
message must have been previously sent (i.e., witnessed) by the sender S.
The above specifications are indeed safe. Therefore, the TESLA security
condition, together with Condition (4.1), allows the receivers to correctly
authenticate the packets. On the other hand, if one weakens the specifica-
tion by avoiding, for instance, to check Condition (4.1) on the first packet
(transition verstep1 in the first schema), the same property becomes false.
5.2.3 Zhou-Gollmann efficient Non Repudiation Pro-
tocol
The encoding of the Zhou-Gollman efficient Non Repudiation Protocol in
THLPSL is the straightforward translation of its encoding in A-B notation.
The only details missing from the A-B notation, are the encoding of the
protocol duration T and the channels timings. Following is the encoding in
THLPSL of the protocol with T = 5 and instant channels.
role Alice( A, B, TTP : agent, SND, RCV : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SNDTTP, RCVTTP : channel(dy, 0, inf ),
SA, SB, STTP : public_key, K : symmetric_key, M : text )
played_by A def=
exists State : nat,
L : text(fresh),
% Costanti
FNRO : nat,
FNRR : nat,
FSUB : nat,
FCON : nat,
FGETA : nat,
T : nat
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init State = 0 /\
% Initialisation
FNRO = 1
FNRR = 2 /\
FSUB = 3 /\
FCON = 4 /\
FGETA = 5 /\
T = 5
transition
alice1. State = 0
=>>(0,5)
State’=1 /\ SND(FNRO.B.L’.T.M_(K).FNRO.B.L’.T.M_(K)_inv(SA)_(SB))
alice2. State = 1 /\ RCV( FNRR.A.L.FNRR.A.L.T.M_(K)_(SB)_inv(SA) )
=>>(0,5)
State’=2
alice3. State = 2
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 3 /\ SNDTTP( FSUB.B.L.T.K.FSUB.B.L.T.K_inv(SA)_(STTP) )
alice4. State = 3
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 4 /\ SNDTTP(FGETA)
alice5. State = 4 /\ RCVTTP( FCON.A.B.L.K.FCON.A.B.L.K_(STTP)_inv(SA) )
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 5
end role
role Bob( A, B, TTP : agent, SND, RCV : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SNDTTP, RCVTTP : channel(dy, 0, inf ),
SA, SB, STTP : public_key, K : symmetric_key, M : text )
played_by B def=
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exists State : nat,
L : text,
Y : message,
W : symmetric_key,
% Constanta
FNRO : nat,
FNRR : nat,
FSUB : nat,
FCON : nat,
FGETB : nat,
T : nat
init State = 0 /\
% Initialisations
FNRO = 1 /\
FNRR = 2 /\
FSUB = 3 /\
FCON = 4 /\
FGETB = 6 /\
T = 5
transition
bob1. State = 0 /\ RCV( FNRO.B.L’.T.Y’.FNRO.B.L’.T.Y’_(SA)_inv(SB) )
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 1
bob2. State = 1
=>>(0,5)
SND( FNRR.A.L.FNRR.A.L.T.Y_inv(SB)_(SA) ) /\ State’=2
bob3. State = 2
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 3 / SNDTTP(FGETB)
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bob4. State = 3 /\ RCVTTP( FCON.A.B.L.W’.FCON.A.B.L.W’_(STTP)_inv(SB) )
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 4
end role
role TServer( A, B, TTP : agent,
SNDTTPA, RCVTTPA : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SNDTTPB, RCVTTPB : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SA, SB, STTP : public_key ) played_by TTP def=
exists State : nat,
L : text,
W : symmetric_key,
% Constants
FSUB : nat,
FCON : nat,
FGETA : nat,
FGETB : nat,
T : nat
init State = 0 /\
% Initialisation
FSUB = 3 /\
FCON = 4 /\
FGETA = 5 /\
FGETB = 6 /\
T = 5
transition
ttp1. State=0 /\ RCVTTPA(FSUB.B.L’.T.W’.FSUB.B.L’.T.W’_(SA)_inv(STTP))
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 1
ttp2a. State = 1 /\ RCVTTPA(FGETA) =>>(0,5) State’ = 2
ttp2b. State = 1 /\ RCVTTPB(FGETB) =>>(0,5) State’ = 3
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ttp3a. State = 2
=>>(0,5)
SNDTTPA( FCON.A.B.L.W.FCON.A.B.L.W_inv(STTP) _(SA)) /\ State’ = 1
ttp3b. State = 3
=>>(0,5)
SNDTTPB( FCON.A.B.L.W.FCON.A.B.L.W_inv(STTP) _(SB)) /\ State’ = 1
end role
role Env( ) def=
composition
Alice(Ai, Bi, TTPi, Sndi, Rcvi, Sndttpia, Rcvttpia,
SAi, SBi, STTPi, Ki, Mi) /\
Bob(Ai, Bi, TTPi, Rcvi, Sndi, Sndttpib, Rcvttpib,
SAi, SBi, STTPi, Ki, Mi) /\
TServer( Ai, Bi, TTPi, Rcvttpia, Sndttpia, Rcvttpib, Sndttpib,
SAi, SBi, STTPi )
end role
goal
end goal
Env()
Differently from the other two protocols we can see, in the encoding of
the TTP rule, the use of looping. The algorithm used in our tool, generally,
cannot handle loops in protocols, this case is peculiar since the TTP does
not generate any nonces. This particular use of loops, i.e.: without nonces
generation, result in a finite state automaton and as such is handled.
Differently from the other two protocols the propertie to check is not an
authentication or a secrecy one so need some appropriate encoding directly
in CTL. The non repudiation property of the protocols, ultimately a fairness
property, can be encoded as a reachability property. In detail we want that
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when the Alice automaton is in any state generated by the label alice5, i.e.:
Alice got its receipt (NRR), Bob is in a state generated by the label bob4,
i.e.: Bob got its receipt (NRO).
The violation of fairness by Bob against Alice can be encoded in the CTL
fragment used by UPPAAL as:
E <> (Bob1.Bob14and!TServer2.TSe23andTServer2.d > 5)
where:
- Bob1.Bob1 4 is the state where Bob got the secret (i.e.: Bob final
state);
- TServer2.TSe2 3 is the state where the TTP got the Alice request;
- TServer2.d s the clock counting the duration of the protocol (5 time
unit in the example).
The symmetric fairness violation by Alice against Bob:
E <> (Alice0.Ali05and!TServer2.TSe22andTServer2.d > 5)
where:
- Alice0.Ali0 5 is the state where Alice got the secret (i.e.: Alice final
state);
- TServer2.TSe2 3 is the state where the TTP got the Bob request;
- TServer2.d s the clock counting the duration of the protocol (5 time
unit in the example).
The encoding of those properties is, of course, not automatic and require
expertise in the peculiar encoding used by the framework but is a demon-
stration of its flexibility. Adding support for goals different from the usual
secrecy and authentication is a possible extension of the framework.
115
Checking the protocol using the above formulae we see that the properties
is violated when the channels are not instantaneous.
TTPs Variant
An interesting different variant of the protocol require the TTP to always
wait for the request from both the principals before answering. This variant
is safe way even when not using instantaneous channels.
role TServer( A, B, TTP : agent,
SNDTTPA, RCVTTPA : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SNDTTPB, RCVTTPB : channel(dy, 0, 0),
SA, SB, STTP : public_key ) played_by TTP def=
exists State : nat,
L : text,
W : symmetric_key,
% Constants
FSUB : nat,
FCON : nat,
FGETA : nat,
FGETB : nat,
T : nat
init State = 0 /\
% Initialisation
FSUB = 3 /\
FCON = 4 /\
FGETA = 5 /\
FGETB = 6 /\
T = 5
transition
ttp1. State=0 /\ RCVTTPA(FSUB.B.L’.T.W’.FSUB.B.L’.T.W’_(SA)_inv(STTP))
=>>(0,5)
State’ = 1
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ttp2a. State = 1 /\ RCVTTPA(FGETA) =>>(0,5) State’ = 2
ttp2ap. State = 2 /\ RCVTTPB(FGETB) =>>(0,5) State’ = 3
ttp2b. State = 1 /\ RCVTTPB(FGETB) =>>(0,5) State’ = 6
ttp2a. State = 6 /\ RCVTTPA(FGETA) =>>(0,5) State’ = 3
ttp3a. State = 3
=>>(0,5)
SNDTTPA( FCON.A.B.L.W.FCON.A.B.L.W_inv(STTP) _(SA)) /\ State’ = 4
ttp3b. State = 4
=>>(0,5)
SNDTTPB( FCON.A.B.L.W.FCON.A.B.L.W_inv(STTP) _(SB)) /\ State’ = 5
end role
The TTP now wait both request before send the receipts. We can see
that the protocol is safe using the modified fairness formula:
E <> (Alice0.Ali05and!TServer2.TSe25andTServer2.d > 5)
or its symmetric.
5.3 Experimental results
The verification environment is implemented in C++ and integrates the com-
piler from THLPSL specifications to UPPAAL XTAs with the model check-
ing engine UPPAAL. To assess the efficiency and scalability of the resulting
environment, we ran it on a number of timed and untimed protocols. An ex-
cerpt of the results of our experiments is given in Table 5.1. The experiments
have been run on a 3.0GHz Pentium IV with 1Gb of memory running Linux
(Slackware 11.0). The column Inst. in the two tables reports the number of
protocol sessions allowed in the corresponding test.
Table reports the time, expressed in seconds, spent by the tool for the
two versions of the TESLA protocol and their flawed versions, as presented
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Protocol Inst CT VT St#/Tr#/M
TESLA 1 1 .028 1.79 27/3458/10
TESLA 2 1 2.37 20.90 20/4716/10
TESLA 1 Flawed 1 2.74 29.73 27/3246/10
TESLA 2 Flawed 1 2.37 58.73 20/4328/10
ZG DY Chn. 1 .01 .33 19/48/23
ZG Oper. 1 .01 .4 19/48/23
ZG OperFix 1 .01 .1 19/48/23
ZG Res. 1 .01 .1 21/47/23
WMF 1-1-3 .01 .44 16/31/6
WMFFix 1-1-3 .01 .03 14/18/6
WMF 2-2-5 .06 129.27 28/158/14
WMFFix 2-2-5 .06 111.31 24/82/14
Table 5.1: Experimental results for Timed Protocols (times are in seconds).
Protocol Inst CT VT St#/Tr#/M# AVISPA OFMC AVISPA SatMC
NSPK 3 .056 .33 17/114/47 .090 .853
NSPK 17 18.961 55.535 93/2955/604 - 25.608
NSPKFix 3 .070 .039 17/98/42 .090 .897
NSPKFix 5 .168 21.674 29/231/74 13.638 1.343
ISO1 2 .012 .015 9/12/13 .059 .502
ISO1 32 57.405 2.727 129/2112/103 19.416 -
PBK 2 .03 .036 17/96/29 .102 .896
PBK 19 9.722 344.575 117/5547/176 - 55.618
PBKFix 2 .036 .065 17/88/37 .191 1.022
PBKFix 19 9.359 250.253 117/3644/203 - 15.659
Table 5.2: Experimental results for Untimed Protocols (times are in seconds).
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Figure 5.3: Tool performances in seconds against protocol sessions.
in the previous chapter, four version of the Zhou-Gollmann non repudiation
protocol, testing the protocol under different assumptions on the communica-
tion channel reliability (i.e., resilient, operational and unreliable channels),
and the original and fixed versions (as proposed by Lowe [Low97]) of the
Wide Mouthed Frog protocol. The column Inst. for the Wide Mouthed Frog
protocol reports the number of instances of the participants involved.
In order to allow for a comparison with state-of-the-art verification tools
for security protocols, we ran our tool on some untimed protocols. Ta-
ble 5.1 shows the experimental results both of our tool and of two verifi-
cation engines included in the AVISPA suite, namely OFMC and SATMC.
The untimed protocol analyzed (taken from the AVISPA library of proto-
cols [ABB+05, Vig06]) are the following: the Needam–Schroeder Public Key
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protocol (original and fixed version), the PBK protocol (original and fixed
version), and the ISO1 protocol. All the tests are parametric in the number
of sessions, where a session involves from two participants. Clearly, the big-
ger the number of sessions, the higher the number of automata and of ground
messages sent/received, leading to a growth in the state space to be analyzed.
The property checked for all the protocols is strong authentication. We only
report the results for the minimal and maximal instance of the protocols we
tried to analyze (the absence of a value for the time spent by a tool, indicates
that it did not terminate within 20 minutes). The results show that, even
though our tool has not been optimized for untimed protocols and the com-
piler and the model checker are not tightly integrated as in the competitor
tools, the performances are still comparable and in some cases that our tool
scales better as the number of sessions increases. Figure 5.3 also shows how
our tool scales against the number of sessions on some untimed protocols.
Both compilation and verification times are reported.
Verification and compilation times are usually not correlated. For ex-
ample in the case of the ISO1 protocol the exchanged messages are heavily
structured, so increasing the number of sessions the compiler needs to con-
sider a exponentially growing number of (sub) message (combinations). The
verification time for the same protocol scales much better since, while the
compiler have to fully generate the automata, the model checker does not
need to explore the full state space but only the portion needed to find an
attack.
Timing also plays a fundamental role in the scaling of the compila-
tion/verification procedure. For example WMF is a timed protocol whose
message structure is quite simple. The number of messages which can be
generated grows slowly as the number of sessions increases. Therefore, the
additional work of the compiler is quite limited. On the other hand, the
verification time increases rapidly, since the model checker have to work on
a timed automaton where timing constraints are actually presents, while for
ISO1 (and all the untimed protocols) timing is absent.
On all the tests, our tool correctly reports the expected attack on the
flawed versions of the protocols and no attacks for the fixed versions.
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Chapter 6
Decidability of the Protocol
Insecurity Problem
In this chapter we focus on the computational complexity of the verifica-
tion security protocols. In section 6.1 we will introduce the complexity of
the problem of verification of security problem we will present the results
already present in bibliography and then move to present, in section 6.2 the
formalism used to specify timed protocols and an example of a protocol speci-
fication. Section 6.3 describes a possible extension of the Dolev-Yao intruder
model to the timed setting. In section 6.4 the semantics of the specifica-
tion language and the notion of attack is defined, together with some crucial
properties which ensure that the space of attacks to a protocols is finite and
polynomially bounded by the size of the protocol. Finally, in section 6.5 an
NP decision procedure for timed protocols insecurity problem is proposed.
6.1 Introduction to the Decidability of the
Protocol Insecurity Problem
In most cases, the shift from an untimed to a timed model causes a signifi-
cant growth in complexity (for instance, the reachability problem for Bu¨chi
automata is linear, while it is PSPACE for Timed Automata). However,
the experimental results with THLPSL do not exhibit a significant growth in
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With fresh terms Without fresh terms
No bound Undecidable Undecidable
Unbounded n. of sessions +
unb. depth messages
Undecidable DEXPTIME-complete
Bounded number of sessions
+ bounded steps + un-
bounded depth messages
NP-complete NP-complete
Table 6.1: Complexity Results
complexity. The question, thus, arises of what the actual computational com-
plexity of verification of THLPSL specifications is. In literature many results
about the decidability and complexity of the protocols insecurity problem
have been settled. While the general case (no bound on messages structure
and on the number of sessions) has been proved to be undecidable [EG82], for
weaker fragments, e.g. by finitely bounding the number of sessions and/or
of the messages, there are interesting decidability results [RT03], [DLMS99],
[DY83]. In particular, the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for
finite number of sessions has been proved to be NP–Complete by M. Rusi-
nowitch and M. Turuani in [RT03]. Table 6.1 resume the main results.
In the following sections we extend the specification formalism of [RT03]
to allow the description of timed dependent security protocols. In particu-
lar, we introduce in this framework the temporal features of THLPSL pre-
sented in the previous chapters. Moreover, we propose a more powerful threat
model, by allowing the intruder to affect some temporal feature of messages.
Notice, that to the best of our knowledge, this is the first temporal extension
of the Dolev-Yao intruder model in the literature.
The main result is that, under the assumption of a finite number of ses-
sions, adding temporal features to the protocols specifications and assuming
a timed intruder model do not change the complexity of the insecurity prob-
lem, which remains NP–Complete. This result justifies the experimental
results we obtained with THLPSL and UPPAAL.
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6.2 Modelling Timed Protocols
We extend the protocol model presented in [RT03] with temporal features.
Similarly to many other specification languages, the model specifies the ac-
tions of the protocols principals as a partially ordered list of steps, which
relate what a principal expects to receive and what the principal sends as a
reaction. We start by defining the structure of messages and terms involved
in principals communication.
Names and Message primitives
We have a finite set of atomic timed messages, Atoms . This set includes
also the set Names of principal names and the set Keys of atomic keys. The
elements of the set Atoms can be composed by means of three primitives:
• pairing: 〈 , 〉;
• symmetric, asymmetric encryption: { }sk { }pk.
Elements of Keys are used only for asymmetric encryption, while any element
of Atoms can be used as the key for symmetric encryption. Given a k ∈ Keys ,
with k−1 we denote its inverse key. We note also that there is no explicit
hashing operator, as it can be simulated using public key encryption.
Given a set of atoms Atoms , the set of structured messages over Atoms ,
denoted by Msg [Atoms ] is generated by the following grammar:
msg ::= Atoms | 〈msg,msg〉 | {msg}pKeys | {msg}smsg
Moreover, given a finite set of (message) variables, Var , the set of message
terms over Atoms , denoted by Term[Atoms ] ⊇ Msg [Atoms ], is given by the
following grammar:
trm ::= Atoms |Var | 〈trm, trm〉 | {trm}ptrm | {trm}strm
In other words, Msg [Atoms ] is the set of ground atoms in Term[Atoms ].
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Given a set of atoms Atoms , a variable substitution over Atoms , ρ :
Var → Term[Atoms ], is a function mapping variables to terms. A variable
substitution is called a ground substitution when it maps variables to mes-
sages (ground terms). We denote with tρ the application of the substitution
ρ to the term t and, for any set E of structured terms, Eρ denotes the set
{tρ | t ∈ E}.
Timed Signature
Actions of principals can be temporally constrained. To this purpose consider
a relative time model where each timed constraint on actions is relative to
the execution of some protocol step, a transition/event from now on. The
general form of a timing constraint is [c, C]label where c and C are numerical
constants (e.g., in Q≥0), and label is the label identifying a transition/event
within the protocol specification. Intuitively, this constraint holds between
the time interval bounded by c + t and C + t, where t is the time when
the transition/event labeled label has occurred. The label start is a special
label which denotes the initialization event of the protocol.
A timed signature can be associated to atomic messages (in Atoms), which
specifies the disclosure and the expiration time of the atom relative to a
transition/event. We use the decoration m[d, e]label to denote that message
m has disclosure time d and expiration time e, relative to the event label.
LabelsT denotes the set of all timed signatures.
A time labeling function ϕ : Atoms → LabelsT assigns a timed signature
to each element of Atoms .
When not otherwise stated, a timed message will have the timed signature
[0,∞]start, denoting a message that is always disclosed and never expires.
Disclosure and expiration times are properties of a message stated at creation
time by some principal and cannot be altered afterwords. Principals can,
however, always check for known messages disclosure or expiration.
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Protocol Specification
A protocol specification is a partially ordered set of send/receive actions
performed by the principals.
To each principal name A ∈ Names we associate a finite set of labels and
a set of protocol steps, indexed over a partially ordered set (WA, <WA). Let
I = {(A, i) | A ∈ Names, i ∈ WA} be the set of labels. Formally, a protocol
specification Pϕ over I is a pair:
〈{(ι, Tι, Rι [te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
Sι)}ι∈I , ϕ〉 , where:
• (ι, Tι, Rι [te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
Sι)}ι∈I is a family of protocol transitions/events in-
dexed over I;
• ϕ is a time labeling function
A protocol step is specified by transitions/events of the form (ι, Tι, Rι
[te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
Sι),
where:
• ι is the label;
• Tι is a set of Boolean predicates of the formDSC(x), EXP (x), ¬DSC(x),
¬EXP (x), with x ∈ V ar ∪ Atoms . The conjunction of the predicates
in Tι specifies the expiration and disclosure constraint of the transition;
• Rι is a term in Term[Atoms ] ∪ {Init, ε} that will be received by the
principal. Init and ε are special terms used to denote the start up of
the protocol and the empty message, respectively;
• Sι is a term in Term[Atoms ]∪{End, ε} that will be sent by the princi-
pal. End and ε are special terms used to denote the end of the protocol
and the empty message, respectively;
• the decoration [te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
of the transition specifies the constraints of
the protocol step:
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– [te, Te]label is the triggering condition. It requires that the transi-
tion takes place between time te and Te, counting from occurrence
of the event label ∈ I;
– [rd,Rd] is the receipt delay, which can be used to model delays
either due to the receive channel or to principal internal activities;
– similarly, [sd, Sd] is the send delay, and can be used to model
delays either due to the send channel or to principal internal ac-
tivities;
The Specification Of The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
As a specific example consider again the Wide Mouthed Frog presented in
section 3.2.
1 A→ S : A, {Ta, B,Kab}Kas
2 S → B : {Ts, A,Kab}Kbs
Below is a possible specification of the protocol, the principals names
are A for Alice, B for Bob, S1, S2 and S3 for three instances of the server
since the language does not allow the use of cycles or multiple instantiation
(both allowed in the THLPSL language). The protocol specification is the
following :
((A, 1), ∅, Init [0,∞]start−→
[0,0][0,0]
〈A, {Ta, B,Kab}sKas〉)
The first step of Alice is also the starting event of the protocol, as indicated by
Init. The timing condition of this step specifies an instantaneous transition
(both delays are [0, 0]) that is always enabled ([0,∞]start). Alice sends the
message 〈A, {Ta, B,Kab}sKas〉 containing the timestamp, the identity of the
intended recipient Bob and the key Kab.
Let us consider the three instances S1, S2 and S3 of the server. Each
instance performs two steps responsible for receiving the timestamp and the
key send by some principal and, after testing that the timestamp is not yet
expired, for sending the key with a new timestamp to the other principal.
The transitions are very similar to the ones of Alice. The transitions of S1
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are the following:
((S1, 1), ∅, 〈A, {s1, B, s2}sKas〉
[0,∞]start−→
[0,5][0,0]
ε)
((S1, 2), {¬EXP (s1)}, ε [0,∞]start−→
[0,0][0,0]
〈{Ts1, A, s2}sKbs〉)
The first one receives the message, supposedly from Alice, and does not sent
anything. The transition is always enabled and takes at most 5 time units
to complete. The second one checks for the non expiration of the timestamp
sent by the principals, and sends a message containing the key and a new
fresh timestamp. S3 performs the same kind of transitions, the difference
with S2 is that S2 expects to be communicating with Bob.
((S2, 1), ∅, 〈B, {s3, A, s4}sKbs〉
[0,∞]start−→
[0,5][0,0]
ε)
((S2, 2), {¬EXP (s3)}, ε [0,∞]start−→
[0,0][0,0]
〈{Ts2, B, s4}sKas〉)
((S3, 1), ∅, 〈A, {s5, B, s6}sKas〉
[0,∞]start−→
[0,5][0,0]
ε)
((S3, 2), {¬EXP (s5)}, ε [0,∞]start−→
[0,0][0,0]
〈{Ts3, A, s6}sKbs〉)
The steps performed by Bob are specified as follows:
((B, 1), ∅, 〈{b1, A, b2}sKbs〉
[0,∞]start−→
[0,5][0,0]
ε)
((B, 2),¬EXP (b1), EXP (b2), ε
[0,0](B,1)−→
[0,0][0,0]
Secret)
((B, 3),¬EXP (b1),¬EXP (b2), ε
[0,0](B,1)−→
[0,0][0,0]
End)
The first step of the principal B is the receive transition. The timestamps
b1 from the server and b2 from principal A are tested for expiration. Notice
that the language is mainly suited to express secrecy. In order to model
authentication as a secrecy property, we introduce the atom Secret, which
will be released if authentication fails. Therefore, the second and third tran-
sitions check for authentication based on validity of the timestamps. The
second transition tests if the timestamp b1 (the one originating from the
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server) is expired while timestamp b2 (originating from A) is not. If so, the
secret is revealed (sending the special message Secret), thereby leading to a
violation of the secrecy. Otherwise, transition three correctly ends the pro-
tocol by sending the message End. Note the timing of the three transitions:
the first one is always enabled and takes at most 5 time units to complete
(the time signature is [0, 5]) modeling a 5 unit delay due to the transmission
channel; the other two transitions are both instantaneous and must be taken
immediately after the first one.
The timed labeling function ϕ is defined as follow:
ϕ = {(Ta, [0, 5](A,1)), (Kab, [0, 11](A,1)), (Ts1, [0, 5](S1,2)),
(Ts2, [0, 5](S2,2)), (Ts3, [0, 5](S3,2))}
We assume the usual ordering of the label, i.e.: 1 ≤WB 2 ≤WB 3, 1 ≤WS1 2,
1 ≤WS2 2, 1 ≤WS3 2.
6.3 Intruder Model
In the Dolev-Yao model [DY83] the intruder has many degrees of freedom,
being able to eavesdrop, divert and memorize messages, compose and decom-
pose them, decrypt and encrypt messages with known keys, and generate new
messages. In the timed model we propose, the DY intruder is extended with
the ability to create, starting from a known timed atom, new timed atoms
whose timing is obtained by shifting in the future the disclosure and expi-
ration times of the original atom. This ability is enabled when the intruder
sends a message containing a timed atom.
Following the notation used in [RT03], the intruder can be specified by
means of a set of rewriting rules on sets of messages. A rule has of the form
L: l→ r, where l, r are sets of messages. A rule L: l→ r is applicable to the
set of messages E ∈ Msg [Atoms ], if l ⊆ E, and the result of the application
is the set E ′ = (E \ l)∪ r. This is denoted by E →L E ′. The rules modeling
a standard D-Y intruder are the following:
Composition Rules:
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• Lc(〈m1,m2〉) : m1,m2 → m1,m2, 〈m1,m2〉;
• Lc({m}pK) : m,K → m,K, {m}pK ;
• Lc({m1}sm2) : m1,m2 → m1,m2, {m1}sm2 .
Decomposition Rules:
• Ld(〈m1,m2〉) : 〈m1,m2〉 → m1,m2, 〈m1,m2〉;
• Ld({m}pK) : {m}pK , K−1 → m,K−1, {m}pK ;
• Ld({m1}sm2) : {m1}sm2 ,m2 → m1,m2, {m1}sm2 .
To model the additional ability of the intruder to generate a fresh timed
atom new(a) starting from a known timed atom a, we introduce the following
rule:
• L(new(a)) : a→ a, new(a).
The atom new(a) is syntactically distinguishable from a and, as we shall
see in the semantics of protocol runs, the disclosure and expiration bounds
are induced by ϕ(a). The temporal difference between new(a) and a is the
transition/event with respect to which the disclosure and expiration times
are computed, which will correspond to the first transition/event receiving
it during a protocol run. We will write newi(a) to denote the atom obtained
by applying rule L(new(a)) to the atom newi−1(a), taking new0(a) = a.
A derivation is a sequence of rule applications E0 →L1 E1 →L2 . . . →Lk
Ek. We write E →∗ E ′ whenever there is a derivation starting from E
and leading to E ′. We say that a message m is forged from E, in symbols
m ∈ forge(E), if E →∗ E ′ and m ∈ E ′. Intuitively, forge(E) contains all
the messages that can be generated or deduced by the intruder from the set
E of known messages.
6.4 Protocol Executions and Attacks
In this section we give the semantics of the protocol specification language.
An environment for a protocol is a pair 〈E,N〉, where N is a finite set
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of timed atoms including Atoms , and E a set of messages contained in
Msg [N ], representing the set of messages sent over the communication chan-
nel. A correct execution order pi for a protocol Pϕ is a one-to-one mapping
pi : I → {1, 2, . . . , |I|} such that for each A ∈ Names if i <WA j then
pi((A, i)) < pi((A, j)). Intuitively, pi defines the execution order of the steps
of the protocol according to the partial ordering <WA . A time sequence
τ : I × {r, s, c} → R≥0 is a mapping which defines the times at which a
particular protocol step takes place. Intuitively, τ(i, r) corresponds to the
time when the reception of a message at step i occurs, τ(i, s) to the time
when the message in step i is sent, and τ(i, c) to the completion time of step
i. To ensure monotonicity of the time sequence the following conditions must
be satisfied:
• for all i ∈ I, τ(i, r) ≤ τ(i, s) ≤ τ(i, c);
• for all i, j ∈ I, pi(i) < pi(j) implies τ(i, c) ≤ τ(j, r).
A protocol run Ξ for Pϕ is a tuple 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈〈E0, N0〉, 〈E1, N1〉, . . . , 〈Ev, Nv〉〉〉,
where v ≤| I |, pi is a correct execution order, ρ is a ground substitution over
Nv and τ is a time sequence, and 〈〈E0, N0〉, . . . , 〈Ev, Nv〉〉 is a sequence of
environments, satisfying the following properties:
• Init ∈ E0, Atoms ⊆ N0 and Ni ⊆ Ni+1;
• for all 1 ≤ k ≤ v,Rpi−1(k)ρ ∈ Ek−1 and Spi−1(k)ρ ∈ Ek;
• τ satisfies the following temporal constraints, according to the tempo-
ral decoration of the transitions/events and to the associated disclo-
sure/expiration guards:
1. for all 1 ≤ k ≤ v, if the pi−1(k) transition is
(pi−1(k), Tpi−1(k), Rpi−1(k)
[te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
Spi−1(k))
, then:
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(a) te ≤ τ(pi−1(k), r)− τ(label, c) ≤ Te: te and Te serve as delay
and timeout for the transition, which is enabled within the
time interval [te, Te] starting from the completion of transi-
tion/event named label;
(b) rd ≤ τ(pi−1(k), s) − τ(pi−1(k), r) ≤ Rd: rd and Rd serve as
bounds for the receiving channel delay;
(c) sd ≤ τ(pi−1(k), s) − τ(pi−1(k), c) ≤ Sd: sd and Sd serve as
bounds for the sending channel delay;
2. for all Boolean predicate ψ ∈ Tpi−1(k):
(a) if ψ has the formDSC(t) (respectively ¬DSC(t)) with ϕΞi (tρ) =
[d, e]label′ , then (τ(pi
−1(k), r) − τ(label′, s) ≥ d) (respectively,
(τ(pi−1(k), r)− τ(label′, s) < d));
(b) if ψ has the form EXP (t) (respectively, ¬EXP (t)) with ϕΞi (tρ) =
[d, e]label′ , then (τ(pi
−1(k), r) − τ(label′, s) ≥ e), (respectively,
(τ(pi−1(k), r)− τ(label′, s) < e)).
where the function ϕΞi is the extension of the timed labeling func-
tion ϕ to Msg [Ni] induced by Ξ at step i and is defined, for all
m ∈ Msg [Ni] as follows:
ϕΞ0 (m) = ϕ(m) if m ∈ Atoms
ϕΞi (m) =

ϕΞi−1(m) if m ∈ Ni−1
[d, e]pi−1(i) if m = new(b) ∈ Ni \Ni−1
and ϕΞi−1(b) = [d, e]label
[0,∞]start otherwise.
Notice that the disclosure/expiration times of messages in conditions
2.(a)-(b) are measured with respect to the sending time associated with
the transition/event specified in their time signature, and that to non
atomic (composed) messages the trivial time signature ([0,∞]start) is
associated.
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When a timed sequence τ satisfies conditions 1.(a)-(c) and 2.(a)-(b) we
say that τ is compatible w.r.t. pi and ρ. A correct protocol execution is a
protocol run where End ∈ Ev;
Given a protocol Pϕ and a secret message Secret and assuming the in-
truder has initial knowledge S0 ⊆ Msg [Atoms ∪ {Charlie}], an attack is a
protocol run 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈〈E0, N0〉, 〈E1, N1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, Nk〉〉〉 such that:
• Spi−1(i)ρ ∈ Ei+1, for any 1 ≤ i < k;
• Rpi−1(i)ρ ∈ forge(S0, Spi−1(1)ρ, . . . , Spi−1(i−1)ρ), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
• Ni ⊇ Ni−1 ∪ {new(a) | new(a) ∈ Subterm(Rpi−1(i)ρ)};
• Secret ∈ forge(S0, Spi−1(1)ρ, . . . , Spi−1(k)ρ).
As an example, consider the specification of the WMF protocol given in
section 6.2. A possible protocol execution is 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈E0, N0〉, . . . , 〈E5, N5〉〉,
where:
• pi = {((A, 1), 1), ((S1, 1), 2), ((S1, 2), 3), ((B, 1), 4), ((B, 2), 5)};
• ρ : {(b1, Ts1), (b2, Kab), (s1, Ta), (s2, Kab)};
• Ni = Atom for all i = 0, . . . , 5 and
– E0 = {Init, A,B};
– E1 = E2 = E0 ∪ {〈A, {Ta, B,Kab}sKas〉};
– E3 = E4 = E2 ∪ {〈{Ts1, A,Kab}sKbs〉};
– E5 = E4 ∪ {End};
• the function τ is reported in the left-hand side of Figure 6.1.
An example of attack to the protocol is 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈E0, N0〉, . . . , 〈E9, N9〉〉,
where:
• pi = {((A, 1), 1), ((S1, 1), 2), ((S1, 2), 3), ((S2, 1), 4), ((S2, 2), 5), ((S3, 1), 6),
((S3, 2), 7), ((B, 1), 8), ((B, 2), 9)};
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label r s c
(A,1) 0 1 1
(S1,1) 1 1 2
(S1,2) 2 3 3
(B,1) 3 3 4
(B,3) 4 4 4
label r s c
(A,1) 0 1 1
(S1,1) 1 1 2
(S1,2) 2 2 2
(S2,1) 2 3 4
(S2,2) 4 5 5
(S3,1) 5 6 6
(S3,2) 7 8 8
(B,1) 8 9 10
(B,2) 11 11 11
Figure 6.1: The time sequences of a correct execution (left-hand side) and of
an attack (right-hand side).
• ρ = {(b1, Ts3), (b2, Kab), (s1, Ta), (s2, Kab), (s3, Ts1), (s4, Kab), (s5, Ts2), (s6, Kab)};
• Ni = Atom for all i = 0, . . . , 9 and
– E0 = {Init, A,B};
– E1 = E2 = E0 ∪ {〈A, {Ta, B,Kab}sKas〉};
– E3 = E4 = E2 ∪ {〈{Ts1, A,Kab}sKbs〉};
– E5 = E6 = E4 ∪ {〈{Ts2, A,Kab}sKbs〉};
– E7 = E8 = E6 ∪ {〈{Ts3, A,Kab}sKbs〉};
– E9 = E8 ∪ {Secret};
• the function τ is reported in the right-hand side of Figure 6.1.
Following [RT03], we show that for each attack there exists an equivalent
attack in a suitable normal form, whose size is polynomially bounded by the
size of the protocol specification. This is an essential property to assess the
decidability and complexity of the insecurity problem. In the rest of the
section we shall show that this property holds also in the timed extension
proposed in this thesis. We first introduce the notion of measure of attacks
as introduced in [RT03].
Let Charlie ∈ S0 be an atom known only to the intruder. The size of a
term t, denoted by | t |, is inductively defined as follows:
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• |Charlie |= 0;
• | t |= 1, if t is an atom;
• |〈x, y〉 |=|{x}y |= 1+ |x | + |y |.
The measure of an attack is given with respect to the size of the messages
received during the protocol execution. More formally, we denote the size of
an attack 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈〈E0, N0〉, 〈E1, N1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, Nk〉〉〉 by the multiset of natu-
ral numbers {|R1ρ |, . . . , |Rkρ |}. An ordering on multisets of naturals can
be defined as follows. The ordering relation  over multisets is the smallest
ordering such that X ∪ {s}  Y ∪ {t1, . . . , tn} if X = Y and s > ti for
all i = 1, . . . , n. For example, {3, 1, 1, 1}  {2, 2, 2, 1}. Given the ordering
relation , we can define the notion of normal attack.
Definition 6.4.1 (Normal Attack) Given a protocol
P = {(ι, Tι, R′ι
[te,T e]label−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
S ′ι), ϕ}ι∈I
, an attack 〈pi, ρ, τ, 〈〈E0, N0〉, 〈E1, N1〉, . . . , 〈Ek, Nk〉〉〉 is normal if the multi-
set {|R1ρ |, . . . , |Rkρ |} is minimal with respect to , with Ri = R′pi−1(i) and
Si = S
′
pi−1(i).
In the following, we assume the standard DAG representation of terms
(e.g., see [RT03]), and, for a term t we write | t |DAG to denote the size of the
graph representing t. Notice that the DAG representation of a term is unique,
and its size is linear in the number of distinct subterms. This allows for a
compact encoding of a protocol terms by merging possible repeated subterms,
preventing the exponential blowup in the representation of protocol runs.
Given an attack of length k, let P = {Ri|i = 1, . . . , k}∪{Si|i = 0, . . . , k},
with Ri = R
′
pi−1(i) and Si = S
′
pi−1(i), denote the set of message terms involved
in the run. The same result on normal attacks proved in [RT03] can, then,
be proved to hold also in the timed setting.
Theorem 6.4.2 ([RT03]) If ρ is a ground substitution in a normal attack,
then for all x ∈ V ar, |xρ |DAG≤|P |DAG.
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The theorem above still holds in our setting since the structure of terms
introduced in this thesis is the same as the one given by [RT03]. The only no-
table difference is, indeed, the introduction of the terms of the form newj(a).
Since newj(a), for any j, is still an atom and, therefore, its size is 1, their
occurrence as subterms in an attack cannot affect its size. As a consequence,
the same proof reported in [RT03] can be trivially adapted to the present
case. In [RT03], Theorem 6.4.2 is enough to ensure that the space of normal
attacks to a protocol is finite. This does not necessarily hold if generation
of fresh atoms by the intruder is allowed (see rule L(new(a)) in the intruder
model definition). On the other hand, the following lemma can be proved.
Lemma 6.4.3 Let ρ be a ground substitution in an attack Ξ, such that the
atom newj(a) occurs as a subterm of Rpi−1(i)ρ for some i. If xρ 6= newj(a)
for all x ∈ V ar, then Ξ is not a normal attack.
Proof For the sake of space, we only report a sketch of the proof of Lemma 6.4.3.
The idea is that we can define a new ground substitution ρ′, by substituting
every occurrence of the atom newj(a) in ρ with the atom Charlie (in other
words, xρ′ = xρ[newj(a) ← Charlie], for all x ∈ V ar). A new attack Ξ′ is
then obtained from Ξ, by substituting ρ with ρ′. Ξ′ can be proved to be still
an attack. The reason is the following. First, every disclosure/expiration
guard in the new attack Ξ′ is still satisfied. This holds as no transition
guard can test the timing of the atom Charlie, since xρ 6= newj(a), for all
x ∈ V ar, and, therefore, newj(a) was never tested for disclosure or expiration
in Ξ. Second, the substitution of newj(a) with Charlie (recall that they are
both atoms) cannot prevent the derivation in Ξ′ of any term occurring in Ξ,
which does not contain newj(a) as subterm. The same holds of the derivation
of new atoms of the form newl(a), with l > j. Indeed, they can be derived
from a, and if a is derivable in Ξ, then so it is in Ξ′. Third, since no variable
is assigned to newj(a) by ρ and the substitution with Charlie is uniform,
Ξ′ satisfies that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k,Rpi−1(j)ρ′ ∈ Ej−1 and Spi−1(j)ρ′ ∈ Ej. The
new attack Ξ′ is clearly smaller than Ξ, since | Charlie |<| newj(a) | and,
therefore, {|R1ρ |, . . . , |Rkρ |}  {|R1ρ′ |, . . . , |Rkρ′ |}. Hence, Ξ cannot be a
normal attack.
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As a consequence of Lemma 6.4.3, the cardinality of the set of timed atoms
occurring in a normal attack of length v cannot be greater than the number
of atoms occurring in the protocol specification plus the number of variables.
In other words, in any normal attack Ξ, | Ni |≤ | V ar | + |Atom |, for any
i = 1, . . . , | v |. This allows us to state the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4.4 For every normal attack Ξ, there exists a normal attack Ξ′,
where no atom of the form newj(a), with j >| V ar |, occurs.
Since V ar, Atom and {newj(a) | a ∈ Atom, j ≤| V ar |} are all finite sets,
Theorems 6.4.2 and 6.4.4 ensure that when searching for attacks we can limit
ourselves to the finite space of normal attacks which contain a finite number
of new atoms smaller than the size | P |DAG of the protocol.
6.5 Complexity of the Timed Insecurity Prob-
lem
In this section we show that the problem of checking insecurity of a timed
protocol is an NP–Complete problem as in the untimed case. Following the
procedure in [RT03] for untimed protocols, to show that the insecurity prob-
lem belongs to NP we need to show that we can guess a run of the protocol,
namely a correct protocol execution order pi of length | I |, a possibly empty
set of new timed atoms, and a ground substitution ρ, and check, in polyno-
mial time, that it is actually an attack as defined in section 6.4. The following
non-deterministic procedure will do the job:
1. Guess a correct execution order pi : I → {1, . . . , v}. Let Ri = R′pi−1(i)
and Si = S ′pi−1(i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , v};
2. Guess a monotone sequence of sets N0 = Atoms ⊆ N1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Nv ⊆
{newj(a) | a ∈ Atom, j ≤| V ar |};
3. Guess a ground substitution ρ : V ar → Msg [Nv], such that for all
x ∈ V, xρ has DAG-size ≤ n;
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4. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , v + 1} guess an ordered list li of n rules whose
principal terms have DAG-size ≤ n;
5. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , v} check that li applied to {Sjρ|j < i} ∪ {S0}
generates Riρ;
6. Check that lv+1 applied to {Sjρ|j < v + 1} ∪ {S0} generated Secret;
7. Check whether there exists a time sequence τ which is compatible w.r.t.
pi and ρ.
If all these checks are successful, then answer YES, and the protocol is inse-
cure. Notice that, with the exception of steps 2. and 7., the other steps are
essentially the same as in the untimed case [RT03] and each can be checked
in polynomial time. Step 2. can easily be performed in polynomial time too.
In the rest of this section we shall show that step 7. can also be checked
in polynomial time. This will prove that the problem belongs to NP. NP–
Hardness results immediately from the fact the untimed security problem
can be easily encoded as a trivial timed insecurity problem.
The existence of a time sequence compatible w.r.t. pi and ρ can be encoded
as a satisfiability problem of a conjunction of Difference Logic constraints.
We shall now show how to build a conjunction of DL constraints which
expresses the existence of a time sequence compatible w.r.t. pi and ρ.
For each execution step i ∈ {1, ..., v}, we introduce three numerical vari-
ables Xpi−1(i),r,Xpi−1(i),s and Xpi−1(i),c, which represent the receive time, the
send time and the completion time of the transition labeled pi−1(i), respec-
tively. Moreover, we need one more variable XStart,c to model the initializa-
tion time and assume that pi−1(0) = Start.
We shall split the task of building the desired DL formula into five subfor-
mula schemata, each encoding one of the required properties of a compatible
time sequence.
First, we need to enforce the monotonicity conditions on a time sequence.
Given a label ι the first monotonicity condition is expressed by the formula:
ΦMonι = (Xι,r −Xι,s ≤ 0) ∧ (Xι,s −Xι,c ≤ 0)
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Given two labels ι, ι′, the second monotonicity condition, stating that the
event ι precedes event ι′, is expressed by the formula:
ΦPrι,ι′ = Xι,c −Xι′,r ≤ 0
Let us now consider the constraints on τ induced by the transition/event
temporal constraints (conditions 1.(a)–(c) in the definition of protocol run).
Given i, let pi−1(i) = ι and Rι
[te,T e]ι′−→
[rd,Rd][sd,Sd]
Sι be the corresponding transition
in P . Then we build the formula:
ΦTrι =
 te ≤ Xι,r −Xι′,c ≤ Te ∧rd ≤ Xι,s −Xι,r ≤ Rd ∧
sd ≤ Xι,c −Xι,s ≤ Sd

The DL formula ΦSι requires that the time decoration of the transition labeled
ι, namely the enabling condition with respect to label ι′ expressing the receive
delay and the send delay, are both satisfied.
Finally, for every transition/event ι we need to encode the disclosure and
expiration constraints in Tι (conditions 2.(a)–(b) in the definition of protocol
run). Let TDsc
+
ι = {tρ | DSC(t) ∈ Tι} and TDsc−ι = {tρ | ¬DSC(t) ∈ Tι}.
Then, the following DL formula
ΦDscι =
∧
m ∈ TDsc+ι
φΞi (m) = [d, e]ι′
(d ≤ Xι,r −Xι′,s) ∧
∧
m ∈ TDsc−ι
φΞi (m) = [d, e]ι′
(Xι,r −Xι′,s < d)
requires that all the disclosure predicates for the timed atoms in the guard of
the transition labeled ι are satisfied. Similarly, let TExp
+
ι = {tρ | EXP (t) ∈
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Tι} and TExp−ι = {tρ | ¬EXP (t) ∈ Tι}. Then, the following DL formula
ΦExpi =
∧
m ∈ TExp+ι
φΞi (m) = [d, e]ι′
(e ≤ Xι,r −Xι′,s) ∧
∧
m ∈ TExp−ι
φΞi (m) = [d, e]ι′
(Xι,r −Xι′,s < e)
requires that all the expiration predicates for the timed atoms in the guard
of the transition labeled ι are satisfied.
Finally, we build the formula:
ΦΞ =
∧
1≤i≤v
 ΦSpi−1(i) ∧ ΦDiscpi−1(i) ∧ ΦExppi−1(i)∧
ΦMonpi−1(i) ∧ ΦPrpi−1(i−1),pi−1(i)

It is immediate to see that satisfiability of ΦΞ ensures the existence of a time
sequence τ which is compatible with the execution of an attack. Notice also
that formula ΦΞ is a conjunction of difference constraints and its length is
clearly linear in the size of the protocol. Thus, checking the existence of a
compatible time sequence can be solved in polynomial time.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Perspectives
In this thesis we contributed to the research area of security protocols analysis
on the following two points:
Verification Framework for Timed Security Protocols
This work has revisited, and further extended the protocol specification lan-
guage High Level Specification Language (HLPSL) with Timed High Level
Specification Language (THLPSL), a timed extension, which explicitly al-
lows to model temporal features of time sensitive protocols. The semantics
of THLPSL was given in terms of Extended Timed Automata (XTA), the
input language of well known model checker UPPAAL. This allowed us to de-
velop an prototype verification tool, Timed Protocol Model Checker (TPMC)
where a THLPSL specification is first translated into XTA and then is given
in input to UPPAAL, together with a property encoding the security goal,
for verification. The environment permit the explicit modelling of temporal
features of protocols while remaining sufficiently high level to be used by
protocol designers and engineers. We presented a number of optimisations
that allowed to keep the size of the resulting XTA as small as possible, in
particular to reduce the number of clocks and the number of locations of
the intruder automaton, increasing the scalability of our approach and al-
lowing the verification on a number of timed and untimed security protocols,
showing encouraging performances.
140
Theoretical Complexity Results for the Timed Protocol Security
Problem
Driven by the results obtained by the implementation of the TPMC check-
ing framework for timed security protocol we investigated the complexity
aspects of their insecurity problem. Using a specification language similar to
the one used by Rusinowitch and Turuani [RT03] and an extended Dolev-
Yao intruder model, we have shown that the insecurity problem for timed
security protocols with a finite number of sessions is NP-Complete. The re-
sult shows that we can add time to protocol specification and verify security
at no additional computational cost. The verification procedure proposed
suggests that state-of- the-art tools developed for untimed protocols, can
easily be extended to cope with the temporal dimension. Indeed, the test
for compatibility can be performed, e.g. using a decision procedure for DL,
independently from the secrecy tests.
7.1 Future Development
Needless to say, there is a lot of room for improvement in the design and
implementation of the verification framework. At the current stage, the envi-
ronment still suffers from some limitations both on the specification language
side and on the verification engine side. In particular, the kind of security
goals which can be tested are limited to secrecy and authentication only,
while it would be useful, in the context of timed protocols, to allow for time
dependent security properties, such as properties which must be satisfied
within some time bounds. Moreover would be interesting researching new
kind of intruders/channels models, such as models where its possible for the
intruder to alter time for some parts of the protocols. (e.g.: timestamps). As
to the verification engine, the current tool builds on top of a model checker
for Timed Automata, which, in order to ensure termination, does not allow
for parametrised temporal constrains. This limits the possibility to specify
and verify protocols where participants can negotiate temporal constants to
rule the evolution of the protocol itself. To cope with these limitation, we are
141
currently investigating further extensions of the environment such as defining
suitable extensions of THLPSL to express time sensitive security goals and
parametric temporal constraints, and integrating analysis techniques based,
e.g., on constraint based decision procedure to overcome the limitations of
our current verification engine. Also, in the light of the complexity results
presented, a more radical move from the Timed Automata framework to a
SAT Modulo Theory/Difference Logic model checking engine could increase
the scalability of the tool allowing for partial order reduction like techniques.
In the formal front future work could include the investigation of the
impact on complexity of strengthening the abilities of the intruder to alter
the time signature of messages. Moreover the current result is limited to
secrecy (and authentication) problem. It would be interesting to investigate
the complexity of checking timed dependent properties (e.g.: fairness).
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